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Sakai ,  Masaki, M.A. ,  February 1985 P o l i t i c a l  Science
Postwar Oapanese-U.S. Security Relations (92 pp.)
Director: Louis Hayes
The most important feature of the m il i ta ry  a l l iance is the pres­
sure from the U.S. for  greater Japanese part ic ipat ion.  The purpose 
of this study is to explain why the Japanese defense has become 
important in the al l iance and to analyze the defense problems 
facing Japan. The focus of this thesis is centered on the impor­
tance of the Japan-U.S. a l l iance during the last three decades of 
the century and the implications of the increased Soviet-Far East 
m il i ta ry  presence for Japan and the U.S. The study covers the 
framework of the Japan-U.S. all iance and the evolution of the 
Japanese perceptions to defense in the period between 1946 to 1983.
After  her defeat in the Pacif ic War in 1945, Japan decided to 
abolish her m il i ta ry  ins t i tu t ion  in the Constitution. However, i t  
is increasingly evident that Japan can no longer indulge herself  
in the pursuit of such ideals under the changing international  
circumstances. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1951 led Japan 
to establish the Police Reserve Force, which la te r  became the Self  
Defense Force. Japan then opted fo r  Japanese-U.S. m i l i ta ry  a l l i ­
ance in view of the prevail ing Cold War. However, between 1950 
and 1970, this defense al l iance had become a controversial public 
debate.
Prior to 1970, Japan had maintained a cordial relationship with 
the Soviet Union despite the fact that the Soviet Union occupied 
the Japanese northern islands in 1945. I t  is in this l igh t  that 
Japan is not interested in direct m il i ta ry  confrontation with the 
U.S.S.R. But during the 1970s, the Soviet m i l i ta ry  capabil ity  in 
the Pacif ic region dramatically increased, and this gave rise to 
serious concern about the defense of Japan. In par t icu la r ,  a f te r  
the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty, the Soviet Union 
began to deploy a new generation of offensive weapons to the 
region, and stationed 10,000 soldiers on the Japanese northern 
islands. The Soviet atti tudes may have been derived from the 
anxiety that she was becoming contained by what she perceived as 
an emerging Washington-Tokyo-Beijing tr iangle against her.
This Soviet m i l i ta ry  pressure set the stage for a transformation 
of Japanese security policy towards the end of the 1970s. In 1976, 
fo r  the f i r s t  time in Japan's postwar history, the two governments 
agreed to in i t i a t e  a jo in t  study on aspects of defense cooperation 
between Japan and the U.S. The significance of the jo in t  defense 
studies to Japan is that she can now have a clear image of what 
she can do on her own, and what she expects from the U.S. More 
concrete planning for  Japanese defense may therefore follow.
i i
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I .  INTRODUCTION 
How fa r  and how fast  should Japan increase i ts  defense efforts?
Since the middle of the 1970s, Japan's defense has drawn attention from 
the West. Japan has been regarded as a free r ider  in the Japan-U.S. 
al l iance.  The U.S. expects Japan to increase defense capabil i t ies  and 
contribute to the defense of the Western Pacif ic .  In fa c t ,  Japan has 
begun to step up i ts  defense e f fo r ts  with increased public support and 
external changes in international s ituations. But these e f fo rts  are 
s t i l l  regarded as too slow and too l i t t l e  by the U.S.
A fter  defeat in World War I I ,  the Japanese sought a moral and 
peaceful base for  securing th e i r  future. With the announcement of the 
Peace Constitution in 1946, Japan forever renounced war as a sovereign 
r ight of the nation. The s p i r i t  of the constitution has had a s i g n i f i ­
cant influence on Japanese minds, and i t  has shaped the ir  postwar culture.
However, i t  has become increasingly evident that Japan can no longer 
commit herself  to the pursuit of such ideals under the r e a l i t y  of other 
nations' power games. On March 12, 1947, President Truman delivered a 
message to Congress regarding the principle of postwar American foreign 
policy. I t  was called the "Truman Doctrine." The principle of American 
foreign policy became the worldwide containment of communism. By the 
end of 1949 the communists took over mainland China. Like West Germany, 
Japan had been transformed by the Cold War from an enemy to a friend  
and proven her worth during the Korean War. Japan started to rearm by 
establishing a Police Reserve Force. She became a United States a l ly  
by signing the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Tokyo decided to take 
responsibi l i ty  for  defending Japan's t e r r i to r ie s  from outside aggression.
1
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In 1960 Tokyo and Washington signed the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and 
Security, and the obligation of the U.S. to come to defend Japan was 
c lear ly  stated without Japan's commitment to defend the U.S. in the 
Western Pacif ic .  For th is  reason, this treaty  has been c r i t ic iz e d  as 
one-sided and unfair .  I t  also la id  down the framework for  Japanese- 
American defense relations in the a l l iance .  During the period from 
American occupation of Japan to the early  1970s, the Japanese defense 
posture had been determined by a strong sense of pacifism and public 
aversion to mil i tar ism. Defeat in World War I I  in f l ic te d  great psycho­
logical and physical damage on the Japanese people. Left is ts  regarded 
the Japanese Self  Defense Force and Japan's security t ies  with the U.S. 
as causes of both war and the new mil i tarism. Defense debates became 
almost taboo in public.
Throughout the 1970s, Japan acquired economic power second only to 
the U.S. among the free nations. While Soviet-American relations had 
rapidly declined, the American public and U.S. a l l ie s  were s t i l l  dreaming 
of sweet detente. Japan was one of the dreamers, and she never doubted 
her basis of peace. A series of external changes--the U.S. withdrawal 
from southeast Asia, the rapid increase of Soviet m i l i ta ry  capabi l i t ies  
in east Asia, the decline of Japan-Soviet relat ions,  the decline of 
Soviet-American re la t ions ,  and the U.S. defense expectation of Japan— 
have had a s ign if icant  influence on the transformation of Japanese per­
ceptions of defense. P a r t ic u la r ly ,  a f te r  the conclusion of the Sino- 
Japanese Peace Treaty in 1977, the Soviet Union has begun to take even 
tougher positions toward Japan. Since 1979, the deployment of 10,000 
Soviet troops on the Etorofu and Kunashiri islands (the formerly Japanese
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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northern islands) has contributed to awakening the Japanese about th e ir  
security.  Also the deployment of SS-20 IRBMs in Siberia and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan have destroyed the theory that Soviet m i l i ta ry  
power constitutes no threat to Japan.
With the growth of Japanese awareness toward defense, the Reagan 
administration has asked Tokyo to acquire the naval capabi l i t ies  to 
secure 1,000 nautical miles of sea lanes, measured from Tokyo, and to 
control three strategic s t ra i ts .  Washington thus chose to emphasize 
roles and missions which the Japanese navy could conceivably implement 
by 1987. Since the middle of the 1970s, Tokyo has gradually begun to 
step up i ts  defense posture with increased public support.
This paper is intended to analyze, from a Japanese point of view, 
defense problems which Japan is facing now. The paper w i l l  deal with 
the framework of the Japan-U.S. a l l iance during the last  three decades 
and the implications of increased Soviet Far Eastern m i l i ta ry  presence 
fo r  Japanese-U.S. defense cooperation. Attention w i l l  be paid to the 
evolution of Japanese perceptions of defense in the postwar era. At 
present, the issues of  Japan's defense are a major subject of Japan-U.S. 
all iance p o l i t ic s .  Under these circumstances, Japanese defense capability 
is kept to a bare minimum, s t i l l  leaving many shortcomings in i ts  
structure.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
I I .  THE FRAMEWORK OF JAPAN-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS
The Impact of the Cold War on the Demil i tar izat ion of Japan
When General Douglas MacArthur accepted the surrender of Japan on 
board the battleship Missouri , the war's end came for  Japan and the 
United States. At that time, nobody knew what was going to happen 
between the Japanese and Americans. The Japanese had been told that  
the conquerors would k i l l ,  rape, and ravage. On the other hand, the 
Americans knew well of the flaming death crashes of Kamikaze p i lo ts ,  
and the g lo r i f ic a t io n  of  sword and suicide in Japanese t rad it ion .
However, the expected tragedy did not occur. The Japanese people 
were ready to accept the defeat since the Emperor told them to "bear 
the unbearable"--and to "endure the unendurable." Of course, there had 
been plots to stop the surrender, but a l l  of them f in a l l y  fa i le d .  Some 
proud soldiers committed suicide to avoid the shame of defeat. But 
once the Emperor's voice had been heard, the unbearable defeat was 
accepted.
In the summer of 1945 the f i r s t  objective of the occupation policy 
was to ensure that Japan would not again become a menace to the United 
States or to the peace and security of the world. The vast American 
Occupation Army was focused on the dem il i ta r izat ion  and democratization 
of Japan.
At that time, the Japanese people had th e i r  strength completely 
spent and th e i r  s e l f  confidence destroyed, which cast them into a kind 
of sp ir i tu a l  vacuum. They accepted the Occupation Army's so-called 
5-0 Policy (Disarmament, D em il i ta r iza t ion ,  D is ind u s tr ia l iza t io n , Decen­
t r a l i z a t io n ,  and Democratization) without resistance. Disarmament of
4
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Japan was the primary task of the m i l i ta ry  occupation. The Japanese 
Imperial General Headquarters, the General S ta f f ,  Japan's ground, a i r ,  
naval forces and a l l  secret police organizations were dissolved by the 
Supreme Commander, General MacArthur.
Also, a l l  persons who supported mil i tar ism and m il i tan t  nationalism 
were excluded from public o f f ice  and from any other substantial private  
positions. In the education system mil i tar ism and nationalism,  
including paramil i tary t ra in in g ,  were eliminated. Former m i l i ta ry  
off icers  and a l l  other exponents of mil i tar ism were excluded from 
teaching positions. Mart ial arts such as Judo, Karate, and Kendo were 
eliminated from the school curriculum.^
The s p i r i t  of  Japan's disarmament ref lected on the formation of 
the 1946 MacArthur constitution. Any armed forces in Japan were pro­
hibited by A r t ic le  9 of  the Constitution:
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based upon 
jus t ice  and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war 
as a sovereign r ight of  the nation and the threat or use of 
force as a means of s e t t l in g  international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, 
land, sea, and a i r  forces, as well as other war po tent ia l ,  
w i l l  never be maintained. The right of belligerancy of the 
state w i l l  never be r e c o g n i z e d . 2
On March 6, 1946 when the d ra f t  Constitution was made public by 
the Japanese government, MacArthur stated, "By this undertaking and 
commitment Japan surrenders rights inherent in her own sovereignty 
and renders her future security and very survival subject to the good
O
f a i th  and just ice  of the peace-loving peoples of the world."
P o l i t i c a l l y  and psychologically, Japan was to ta l ly  disarmed by the 
Supreme Commander, General MacArthur. This messianic idealism of
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General Douglas MacArthur dominated policy making in the f i r s t  years of  
the Occupation. The renunciation of war gave symbolic dignity to 
pacifism in Japan. This no-war clause moved Japan from the European 
diplomatic t ra d i t io n — a balance of power--into the idealism of American 
isolationism.
On the f i r s t  anniversary of Japan's surrender. Prime Minister
Yoshida demonstrated his interpretation of the 1946 Constitution in a
radio broadcast to the nation:
The new constitution provides for renunciation of war, in 
which regard Japan leads the rest of the world. "But you 
are," some may say, "a beaten nation without a single soldier  
and without the power to wage wars." The truth is we do not 
want to repeat the calamitous experience of war even a f te r  we 
have become an independent nation in name and in fact .  Now 
that we have been beaten, and we haven't got a single soldier  
l e f t  on our hands, i t  is a f ine opportunity for  renouncing 
war fo r  a l 1 t im e.4
However, despite the b ir th  of Japan's new idealism, the rest of the 
world was rapidly moving toward the Cold War with the expansion of com­
munism. On March 12, 1947, U.S. President Truman delivered a message to 
Congress about the basis of postwar American foreign policy. I t  was 
called the "Truman Doctrine." A primary purpose of this doctrine was to 
support nations resisting communist penetration. A dominant principle  
of American foreign policy became the world-wide containment of communism. 
In February 1948, Czechoslovakia f e l l  to communism. In June 1948, the 
Berlin a i r l i f t  was started to support free Berlin. In April 1949, the 
North A t lant ic  Treaty Organization (NATO) was organized to defend western 
Europe from communist aggression.
By the end of 1949, the Chinese communists had taken over Mainland 
China. The State Department strongly warned China that the U.S. would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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res is t  any attack upon the small countries of Southeast Asia. In 1950 
a Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance was signed between the 
Soviet Union and Communist China. The Sino-Soviet al l iance became a 
symbol of strong unity in the Communist Bloc. I t  promised resistance 
against aggression from Japan, or countries d ire c t ly  or ind irect ly  
associated with Japan in such aggression.
The Japanese communists emerged from prison in the early days of 
the Occupation. In the 1949 general e lections, the Communist Party won 
10 percent of the vote and 35 seats in the House of Representatives. 
Under th is  s i tua t ion .  Occupation authorit ies began to worry more about 
global communist expansion. Gradually, the image of a strong Japan had 
appeared on the scene against communism in Asia. In January, 1950, 
General MacArthur stated that he would no longer ta lk  about the demil i­
ta r iza t ion  of Japan in public.
T rad i t ion a l ly ,  U.S. policy has been aimed to prevent any a n t i -  
American power from gaining a foothold in East Asia. At the end of the 
19th century. Secretary of State John Hay advocated the Open Door Policy 
fo r  China. I ts  aim was a balance of power in East Asia, for  example, 
America's support toward Japan in the Russo-Japanese War, and i ts  
support toward China in the Pacif ic  War. These facts t e l l  us that the 
U.S. has been concerned about the Open Door Policy and the balance of  
power in the Far East. During the Cold War, this power balance became 
more favorable to the communist powers by the communization of China 
and North Korea. At the end of the 1940s, the U.S. had gradually 
switched the position of Japan from ex-enemy to partner.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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At that time, American policymakers came to the conclusion that not 
only was communism an expansionistic p o l i t ic a l  philosophy, but the 
Kremlin was a leader o f  the movement. According to George Kennan,
Soviet leaders always feel insecure about th e i r  p o l i t ic a l  a b i l i t y  to 
keep power within Soviet society and the outside world. Also, they are 
obligated to expand Soviet communism to the rest of the world. There­
fore ,  Soviet foreign policy often becomes host i le  to outside forces. 
Kennan argued, under this circumstance, that the U.S. policy toward the 
Soviet Union should be a long-term containment of Russian expansion. 
President Truman made Kennan's idea the cornerstone of American postwar 
foreign policy. At the beginning of 1950, a small ad hoc committee of  
State and Defense Department, headed by Paul N itze ,  drafted NSC 68 to 
systematize containment. NSC 68 envisioned a world in which gains for  
communism anywhere produced losses fo r  the U.S. and i ts  a l l i e s .  With 
the outbreak of the Korean War, this became the d e f in i t iv e  statement of 
American security policy. Thus, the U.S. emerged in the international  
community as a grand crusade against communist e x p a n s i o n . 5 At the 
beginning of the 1950s, the U.S. began to expect Japan to be a part of 
the containment network against communism in East Asia.
On June 22, 1950, John Foster Dulles, General Bradley, and Defense 
Secretary Johnson arr ived in Tokyo to discuss the Japanese issues. For 
the f i r s t  time Dulles met with Yoshida and t r ie d  to bring up Japan's 
rearmament on the diplomatic table .  Dulles expected that Yoshida would 
accept his plan of Japan's rearmament. But Yoshida rejected Dulles's  
proposal. Yoshida's argument was as follows: economically Japan could
not afford i t .  Some Asian countries and Japan's public opinion would
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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never accept Japan's rearmament, and possibly they would take i t  as a 
revival of  Japan's m il i ta r ism . At that meeting, Yoshida suggested that  
the issue should be brought d i re c t ly  to General MacArthur, to which 
Dulles agreed. The Supreme Commander MacArthur expressed f u l l  sympathy 
fo r  Yoshida"s concerns and supported Yoshida"s proposal. Yoshida 
believed Japan's rearmament was p o l i t i c a l l y  impossible and that Japan 
needed U.S. armed forces. In his plan, Japan was to sign the security  
t reaty  with the U.S. in order to get American protection of Japan.
Then Japan was to get independence from the U.S. Occupation, and was to 
jo in  the United Nations as an independent nation. The Cold War gave 
Japan a good opportunity to achieve th is  goal.® In order to achieve 
early  independence, Yoshida needed to avoid any domestic p o l i t ic a l  c r is is  
which could be created by Japan's rearmament issue.
In June 1950 the North Koreans suddenly attacked South Korea across 
the 38th p a r a l le l .  On June 30, General MacArthur was given authority  
to send U.S. ground troops to South Korea. At the same time, Washington 
directed him to take necessary measures for the security of Japan. In 
the shock of the sudden attack in Korea, communist menaces were expected 
from a l l  directions at any time. The U.S. government realized that a 
well organized defense mechanism was urgently needed to protect U.S. 
a l l i e s .  P a r t ic u la r ly ,  as Japan had been t o t a l l y  disarmed since 1945, 
Japan and the U.S. needed some kind of defense system to protect Japan 
from the communist aggression. As a re s u l t ,  the commander of a l l i e d  
occupation troops. General MacArthur, ordered the Japanese government 
to create a 75,000 man National Police Reserve Force. The main purpose
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of th is  force was to prevent any internal communist rebell ion when 
American troops were out of Japan.
However, the creation of National Police Reserve (NPR) was carried  
out in secrecy because of A r t ic le  9 of the 1946 Peace Constitution. For 
example, recruits to the NPR were not informed of the real nature of the 
new m i l i ta ry  organization. For example, tanks were euphemistically 
called "special vehicles." The NPR was stationed in 37 camps throughout 
Japan. Later in October 1951, Japan's government got r id  of previous 
barriers against the recruitment of former o f f icers  of the Imperial Army 
and Navy. F in a l ly ,  243 graduates of the Imperial Army and Navy academies 
were enrolled in the l i s t  o f  the f i r s t  o f f ic e r  corps.
Prime Minister Yoshida did not take a position that the creation of 
the National Police Reserve Force would constitute a step in the direc­
tion of rearmament. He simply believed that the new force was designed 
purely for the purpose of maintaining order within Japanese te r r i t o r y  
and bore no re la t ion to anything in the nature of rearmament. He re a l ­
ized that communist a c t i v i t y  within Japan had begun an attempt to bring 
about a revolution by force. American imperialism became the declared 
enemy of  the Japanese Communist Party and American policy was attacked 
at every turn. At that  time, the Japanese Communist Party had received 
directions from Moscow as a part of the international communist movement. 
Moscow came to a conclusion that the Japanese communists could interrupt  
American m i l i ta ry  a c t iv i t i e s  in Japan, and possibly could overthrow the 
pro-American Yoshida government. With the outbreak of the Korean War, 
General MacArthur raised fears that communist a c t iv i t y  in Japan would 
increase and would be more r a d i c a l . 7 The result  of the outbreak of the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Korean War and communist a c t i v i t i e s  in Japan contributed to the creation  
of the NPR. General MacArthur believed that  the development of defen­
sive forces in Japan would not indicate  a revival  of m i l i ta r ism  with the 
success o f  his democratization program. The creation of a Japanese army 
was regarded as the f in a l  l in k  in the Japan-U.S. a l l ia n c e  against the 
Soviet Union and communist China.
The 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Establishment of the Self  
Defence Force
With the outbreak o f  the Korean War, the U.S. government decided 
to set up a co l le c t ive  security  network in the Western P ac i f ic .  But 
th is  idea qu ie t ly  disappeared, because a mix of "Asian weaklings" and 
"a l l  white powers" could never be mutually formed. For th is  reason, 
the U.S. government decided to sign separate security t re a t ie s  with 
Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and A ustra l ia .  These t re a t ies  s t i l l  e x is t  
today.
In 1947 Prime M in is te r  Yoshida and his successor Katayama asked 
the U.S. to provide protection fo r  Japan against i t s  t ra d i t io n a l  enemy, 
the Soviet Union. A f te r  a short whi le ,  the U.S. promised to provide 
temporary protection to Japan. In 1951 Japan and the U.S. signed the 
Security Treaty as a part  o f  an anti-communism network in East Asia,
This t re a ty  promised to provide American protection to Japan. But i ts  
protection was temporary u n t i l  Japan could build i ts  own defense forces.
Yoshida believed that  Japan had no r e a l i s t i c  option other than to 
re ly  upon a b i la t e r a l  m i l i t a r y  agreement with the United States. His 
decision stemmed from his own t ra d i t io n a l  view of balance of power and 
his b e l i e f  of  the era of  the Anglo-Japanese a l l i a n c e — the Pax Britan ica
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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was replaced with the Pax Americana. Yoshida believed a l l iance  with  
the U.S. was the best way to secure Japan. By Apri l  1950 Yoshida came 
to the conclusion that  i t  would be emotionally d i f f i c u l t  for  the 
Japanese to endure a continuation of the occupation u n t i l  an overall  
peace was s e t t le d .  Yoshida's personal b e l ie f  in an era of Pax Ameri­
cana, and his concerns about a continuation of the U.S. occupation 
f i n a l l y  got him to sign the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. By signing 
th is  t r e a ty ,  Japan got independence from the U.S. occupation:
Japan desires, as a provisional arrangement fo r  i t s  defense, 
that the United States of America should maintain armed forces 
of i t s  own in and about Japan so as to deter armed attack upon 
Japan. The United States of America, in the in te res t  of peace 
and secur i ty ,  is  presently w i l l in g  to maintain certa in of  i ts  
forces in and about Japan, in the expectation, however, that  
Japan w i l l  increasingly assume resp on s ib i l i ty  fo r  i ts  own 
defense against d i re c t  and ind ire c t  aggression, always avoiding 
any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other 
than to promote peace and security  in accordance with the pur­
poses and pr incip les of the United Nations Charter .8
The Korean War dramatical ly  heightened Japan's importance in U.S. 
m i l i t a r y  strategy. I t  showed the Japanese conservatives that continued 
U.S. m i l i t a ry  presence in Japan was favorable to ensure Japan's security  
against Soviet expansion. Also, a new Japanese m i l i t a r y  industr ia l  
complex was given b i r th  by the Korean War. The loss of  weapon procure­
ment fo r  U.S. troops in Korea f i n a l l y  forced Japan to continue rearming.
Since the signing of  the f i r s t  Security Treaty in 1951, several 
security  issues had been discussed in Japan's domestic p o l i t i c s .  F i r s t ,  
the Japanese Diet discussed Japan's inherent r ig h t  of  s e l f  defense and 
r ig h t  to enter  c o l le c t iv e  secur i ty .  Second, soc ia l is ts  said A r t ic le  I 
of the Security Treaty touched the sensit ive question of Japan's 
sovereignty:
i
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. . . inc lud ing assistance given at the express request of the 
Japanese government to put down large scale internal riots 
and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or 
intervention by an outside Power or P o w ers .9
In fa c t ,  the social ists f e l t  that Japan had become an American colony. 
Third, the U.S. promised to maintain armed forces in Japan, in the 
expectation that Japan would increasingly assume responsibility for i ts  
own defense. These three references to collective security, stationing 
of U.S. forces in Japan, and Japan's defense efforts drew charges of 
c onf l ic t  with Ar t ic le  9 of the 1946 Japanese Constitution.
Japan's Social ist  Party part icular ly  opposed the 1951 Security 
Treaty. The Social ist  Party formulated three policies to maintain for  
Japan's security: (1) conclude one peace treaty with a l l  i ts  former
enemies, (2) maintain neu tra l i ty ,  and (3) neither conclude m il i ta ry  pacts 
with any one country nor give m il i ta ry  bases in Japan to any foreign 
countries. These three policies were massively supported by labor unions 
such as Sohyo ( l e f t i s t  labor union), the Teachers' Union, and the National 
Railway Workers Union. They believed that peaceful coexistence was 
possible between the free world and the Communist Bloc. Therefore, 
all iance with the West would only jeopardize Japan's position of neutrality. 
Their policy was based upon an assumption that the Eastern Bloc wanted 
peace with the West.
On the other hand, the conservatives claimed that as long as Japan 
sided with the West, neutra l i ty  was impossible. Communist aggression 
must be countered by se l f  defense power. On October 23, 1951, the 
t reat ies  (the Peace Treaty and the Security Treaty) were already in the 
Diet 's  session. Just before f inal  votes, the social ist  convention s p l i t  
into two. Left wing socia l ists voted against those treaties and right
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wing social ists voted for  the Peace Treaty and against the Security 
Treaty.
However, most Japanese people supported the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty regardless of the l e f t  wing opposition. In September, 1950, a 
Mainichi poll indicated 70 percent in favor of preparations for defense, 
while only 20 percent wanted defense in cooperation with the U.S. By 
December, 1950, 41.2 percent were in favor of maintaining American 
troops in Japan. In February 1951, 77.2 percent of the people polled 
approved American troops only temporarily. The Japanese government and 
the Japanese people accepted the security treaty as a necessary part of 
peace maintenance.TO
The strategic meaning of the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty was 
very s ign if icant  for  the U.S. m i l i ta ry  strategy. Geographically and 
s tra teg ic a l ly ,  Japan was situated directly  on the Far East's Cold War 
f ro n t ie r  and i ts  four main islands could be used for offensive or defen­
sive purposes. In fa c t ,  Japan is l ike  an unsinkable a i rc ra f t  carr ier .
For example, Yokosuka Naval Base near Yokohama was part icularly  important 
to American defense strategy. Since the end of World War I I ,  i t  has been 
the Far East pivot of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, and i t  had the only f a c i l ­
i t i e s  in the Far East capable of drydocking a i rc ra f t  carr iers. I f  the 
base were denied to American arms, the Seventh Fleet would have to sh if t  
repair  operations thousands of miles across the Pacif ic to Pearl Harbor.
Under this t rea ty ,  Japan offered the Ogasawara Islands (the 
southern islands) and the Okinawa (the southwestern islands) for  Ameri­
can troops. For the Japanese leaders, the t reaty 's  purpose was to gain 
American protection. For the American leaders, i ts  purpose was to gain
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Strategic dominance of East Asia by u t i l i z in g  bases in Japan, In the 
American defense plan, Japanese forces and bases could be used for a 
regional defense role.
From Siberia to North Vietnam, the communists had maintained 
massive forces, and most of them were facing the Western Pacific Ocean. 
They wanted to control and set up a buffer zone against invasion from 
the West. From the northern anchor of Japan to South Korea, Taiwan, 
and South Vietnam, this area had been heavily defended by U.S. a i r  and 
naval power. The Soviet Union has constituted three kinds of threats 
to the security of the U.S. and i ts  a l l i e s .  F i rs t ,  i t  is the threat of 
vast m i l i ta ry  power. Second, there is the threat of a very highly 
organized system of espionage. I t  is a fact that communism is a univer­
sal f a i th  for some people who are w i l l in g  to cooperate with the in te r ­
national communist a c t iv i t ie s .  Third, there is the threat of communism 
as an idea that leads to the destruction of the accepted values held by 
both western and eastern c iv i l iz a t io n s .  To protect free nations, Japan 
became a cornerstone of American defense strategy with the signing of 
the security treaty.
H is to r ic a l ly ,  the Soviet Union has deployed massive m il i ta ry  power 
in the Far East. There is a major Soviet base at Vladivostok and others 
along the lower Kamchatka Peninsula and in southern Siberia. By the 
middle of  the 1950s, the Soviet Union had an estimated 400,000 man army,
4,000 plane a i r  force, and a navy that included 6 cruisers and 110 sub­
marines. China was reported to have a ground force of 3 mil l ion men, 
an a i r  force of 3,000 planes and a 170,000 ton navy. North Korea had a
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400,000 man army, 800 combat planes, and a small navy. North Vietnam 
had a guer i l la  trained army of  300,000.11
Arrayed against these forces. South Korea had a 580,000 man army, 
the U.S. had the Eighth Army, including the F irs t  Calvary and Seventh 
Infantry Divisions, and the U.S. F i f th  A ir  Force in South Korea and 
Japan. Japan had a 160,000 man ground force, a navy of 140,000 tons and 
500 planes. Taiwan and 560,000 men in the army and 300 planes. Okinawa 
had 9 U.S. a i r  squadrons, 2 regiments of a marine division, and 2 Nike 
Hercules missile batta lions. The Philippines had a 50,000 man army. 
Backing up a l l  of  those forces was the very powerful U.S. Seventh Fleet.1  ̂
The deployment of the Seventh Fleet has been sustained by a naval base 
in Yokosuka, Japan. I t  was the s ign if icant  meaning of the 1951 Japan- 
U.S. Security Treaty fo r  the U.S. defense strategy in East Asia.
Japan, s t ra teg ic a l ly  located, possessed a mature industrial economy, 
abundant labor supply, and a strong m i l i ta ry  potentia l .  Like West Ger­
many, Japan had been transformed by the development of the Cold War from 
an enemy to a fr iend and had proved i ts  worth during the Korean War.
By the time Eisenhower took o f f ic e ,  the original plan to neutralize and 
disarm Japan had given way to a decision to incorporate i t  in a defense 
system. In the meantime, the Soviet Union and China have t r ied  using 
many methods to divide Japan from the West. However, Japan had stayed 
in the middle of East-West tensions since 1950 to 1970.
During the Korean War, Japan and the U.S. had promoted the three 
constituent aspects of Japan's subsequent part ic ipation in cold war 
m il i t a ry  a c t iv i t i e s ;  f i r s t ,  both countries maintained U.S. bases in 
Japan; second, they developed Japan's rearmament; th i rd ,  Japan made a
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move towards industr ia l iza t ion .  In 1951 the National Police Reserve 
developed into a larger National Safety Force. The ground and maritime 
forces were organized under a new defense establishment. In the mean­
time, the Japanese government never admitted that the new armed forces 
were a v iolat ion of the peace constitution. Therefore, Japan could 
engage in m i l i ta ry  action against an aggressor for defense purposes. 
Yoshida had a good sense of diplomacy. He strongly believed that there 
was l i t t l e  to be gained e ither  domestically or internationally  by an 
open aff irmation of Japanese rearmament until  Japanese sovereignty was 
restored.
On March 6, 1952, Yoshida declared his opinion about Japan's 
defense. He stated that "when Japan gains strength, acquires enough 
economic assets.,  and foreign powers acknowledge Japan's r ight to se l f -  
defense, we may then resort to a referendum for constitutional revision 
in order to possess f ighting p o te n t ia l . "13 Yoshida's speech was encour­
aged by a v i s i t  from Vice President Richard Nixon in 1953. Nixon stated 
that  A r t ic le  9 of the Japanese constitution was a mistake and should be 
revised to meet the Soviet challenge in East A s i a . 14
In March of 1954, Japan and the U.S. signed the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement. In this agreement, Japan was required to f u l f i l l  
i ts  own defense responsib i l i ty ,  and to control trade with the Communist 
Bloc as one of the U.S. a l l i e s .  On the other hand, Japan gained several 
concessions: f i r s t ,  Japan's promotion of the defense industry based
upon the precondition of economic s t a b i l i t y .  The U.S. indirect ly  
accepted Japan's defense buildup paral le l  to economic recovery; second, 
Japan's defense expansion must be within the constitution (Japan's
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armament is for  only se l f  defense); th i rd ,  Japan was allowed to receive 
aid from a third country. Thus, Japan was allowed to receive aid from 
Europe. U.S. Ambassador All ison stated, "this agreement takes us one 
step nearer the time, when the United States can withdraw its forces
from J a p a n . "15
In July 1954, Japanese forces were given a mission by the Self  
Defense Force Law. The mission of the Self Defense Force was to defend 
Japan against both direct  and indirect  aggression. The year 1954 was a 
defense year for  Japan. The cabinet's f inal  draft  of the Defense Agency 
Laws and Self  Defense Forces Law were submitted to the Diet and subse­
quently passed without amendment. Under these defense laws, the organi­
zational structure was designated, and a separate a i r  force was estab­
lished. In creating an a i r  force, Japan assumed responsibil ity for  
part ic ipat ing in defense of i ts  a i r  space. Japan basically has concen­
trated upon the creation of a re la t iv e ly  small but sophisticated military 
organization since that time.
In December, 1954, the Japanese government created a new interpre­
tat ion of the 9th a r t ic le  of the Constitution. Before that time, the 
Japanese government had taken a position that "war potential was a 
capacity to wage modern war." Since December 1954, the government has 
taken a position that "war potential is m il i ta ry  power beyond the 
minimum that is necessary for  se l f  defense."16 All these statements 
indicated that Japan's economic as well as m i l i ta ry  commitment is for  
containment of communism and counterrevolution in East Asia. The 
Japanese conservatives realized that Japan's commitment was to contain­
ment with the assumption that at some time in the future this commitment 
would necessarily require constitutional revision.
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Since 1955, defense issues in Japan have been defined in the narrow 
sense of maintaining national te r r i to r ia l  in te g r ity ,  and not defined in 
a broad strategic  sense. Despite the fact that Self Defense Forces are 
structured around a f ive -year defense plan, they display two main char­
a c te r is t ic s .  F irs t ,  each f ive-year defense plan has never shown long­
term clear goals. Second, f ive-year defense plans have developed more 
in a budgetary direction than a strategic one. This tendency remains 
even today.
In 1956 a National Defense Council was organized to discuss general
national security issues. C ritics  argued that this council has never
discussed security issues seriously, regardless of i ts  name. This
council is composed of the Prime Minister and the other ministers. In
1957, a National Defense Council (NDC) publicized a Basic National
Defense Policy and the F irs t  Defense Buildup Plan. The Basic National
Defense Policy read:
The goal of national defense is to prevent direct and indirect  
aggression in the future; and i f  by chance aggression occurs, 
to repel i t ;  and thereby to preserve our country's independence 
and peace which takes as i ts  basis the principles of democracy.
To achieve this goal, the basic policy is as follows:
1. To support action of the United Nations, to promote in te r ­
national cooperation, and to achieve world peace.
2. To firm ly  establish the necessary basis to s tab ilize  
people's l ive lihood , increase th e ir  patriotism , and guarantee 
the security of the state.
3. To gradually build up e ffe c t iv e  forces to provide the 
minimum degree of defense necessary in accord with national 
strength and national sentiment.
4. Until the United Nations is able to acquire the a b i l i ty  
to e f fe c t iv e ly  stop external aggression, to deal with i t  on 
the basis of the security system with the United S tates .17
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The F irs t Defense Buildup Plan aimed at a Ground Self Defense Force 
of 180,000 men, a Maritime Self Defense Force of 124,000 tons of ship­
ping and 200 a i r c r a f t ,  and an A ir  Self Defense Force of 1,300 a irc ra f t .  
This plan provided a basis of Japan's postwar defense power.18
However, Japan's rearmament and the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 
created a serious division of i ts  domestic p o lit ic s .  The conservatives 
believed that defense power is necessary to defend Japan, and aimed at 
amending the Constitution to authorize arming for defense. On the 
other hand, the socia lis ts  have insisted on no defense power and aboli­
tion of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Defense has been a central 
concern to a l l  of the opposition parties (the Socia lis t Party and the 
Communist Party ), and i t  has given th e ir  broad defin it ion  to Japanese 
public opinion. The two effects of the opposition parties ' actions 
have been to fuel anti-American feelings and to give p o lit ic a l  identity  
to pacifism.
In fa c t ,  there was no consensus about defense in Japan. This 
p o l i t ic a l  s ituation and postwar pacifism has made a social status of 
the Self Defense Force much lower than that of the Imperial Army and 
Navy. For example, there have been no Tokyo University graduates in the 
SDF. Since they wore American uniforms and generally used American 
equipment, soldiers were often sneered at on the streets as foreign 
mercenaries. Since no one was threatening Japan, the money spent on 
defense was wasted. Some high schools refused to partic ipate in the 
Japan A th le tic  Festival when students found out that policement and 
S e lf  Defense Forces personnel had also entered. In some primary schools, 
some students thought of children of the SDF personnel as children of
\
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k i l le r s .  Throughout the 1950s, a great number of pacifis ts  and le f t is ts  
attacked the SDF under the name of jus tice  of the Constitution.
During the period from 1950 to 1957, the Yoshida government and the 
U.S. Occupation Army had conducted rem ilita r iza tion  of Japan with results 
being the 1951 Security Treaty and the establishment of the Self Defense 
Forces. In 1957 the F irs t Defense Buildup was passed by the Diet and i t  
came into e ffec t in 1958. The main purpose of the plan was to creat a 
basic defense power that could be expanded to a larger scale in case of 
an emergency. With the growth of Japanese desire for more independence 
and the global communist expansion, Japan began to rearm i ts e l f .
The 1960 Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security
In June 1957, Prime Minister Kishi went to Washington, D.C. to ask 
fo r  a new security trea ty . Kishi wanted a new treaty which reflected  
the fact that Japan was no longer defenseless as a result of the F irst  
Defense Buildup (1955-1960). Japan was ready to take on more of the 
burden of i ts  defense with respect to i ts  own homelands. Kishi also 
intended to check up on the deployment of American troops at the m ilita ry  
bases in Japan. At that time, Kishi and Eisenhower signed a jo in t  com­
munique, which promised to establish a jo in t  intergovernmental security 
consultative committee. In this committee achievement of two issues was 
promised: F irs t ,  by the end of 1958, evacuation of a l l  American ground
troops from Japan; second, the return of Japan's jurisd iction  over the 
Ogasawara (the southern islands) and Okinawa (the southwestern islands)/ 
Kishi sought much greater influence in the defense relations between 
Japan and the U.S.
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In la te  1958, the Socia lis t and the Communist Parties (the opposi­
tion p o l i t ic a l  p a r t ie s ) ,  m il ita n t  labor unions and some le f t i s t  students 
had staged a successful protest campaign against the Kishi administra­
t io n . They protested against a b i l l  to increase police powers. The 
Socia lis t Party had successfully combined the police b i l l  protest with 
the new security treaty  protest. The soc ia lis ts , the People's Council 
to Prevent Revision of the Security Treaty, and the National Federation 
of Student Self Government Associations had opposed the new treaty  
since i ts  introduction into the Diet. On November 27, 1959, approxi­
mately 5,000 workers and students broke into the Diet.
In 1960 Japan experienced a serious p o lit ic a l cris is  between con­
servatives and le f t is ts  due to revision of the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty. In Tokyo, the largest scale rio ts  were conducted by the stu­
dents, and resulted in the death of a Tokyo University student. In 
January 1960, a student group at the Tokyo International Airport 
attempted to prevent Prime Minister Kishi's v is i t  to Washington to sign 
the new security trea ty . In May 1960, the Japanese government's passage 
of the treaty  in the Diet produced c r i t ic a l  problems such as strong 
opposition from the l e f t .  In protest, the socialists sat down in the 
corridor to prevent the speaker from opening the meeting. F in a lly , 500 
policemen entered the Diet to get r id  of them. The socialists refused 
to attend any other Diet meeting, and they attempted to dissolve the 
Diet. They expected that i t  would lead to a new election, which would 
stop ra t i f ic a t io n  of the new security trea ty . Prime Minister Kishi was 
surprised at the reaction of the le f t  wing. Nearly a l l  major newspapers 
blamed the Kishi government's ta c tic  in pushing through the treaty.
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Large scale demonstrations and strikes were organized by the left-wing  
to prevent the Diet from ra t ify in g  the treaty.
On June 10, 1960, Eisenhower's press secretary, James Hagerty, was 
attacked by a group of l e f t i s t  students. He was rescued by an army 
helicopter. On June 15, 1960, u l t r a - le f t is t  students attacked the Diet. 
On the same day. Prime Minister Kishi asked the U.S. government to post­
pone President Eisenhower's v is i t  in Japan. These incidents caused the 
f a l l  of the Kishi government and the cancellation of President Eisen­
hower's v is i t  to Japan. The Japanese le f t is ts  regarded the new security 
treaty  as a betrayal of Japan's peace constitution, and as a factor in 
the buildup of imperialism. With l e f t i s t  rebellion, the dissident fac­
tions of the Liberal Democratic Party (pro-American ruling party) 
demanded Kishi's resignation and blamed his method of ratify ing  the new 
security trea ty . In June 1960, a revised treaty was approved by the 
Diet. Prime Minister Kishi resigned from his o ff ic e ,  and President 
Eisenhower decided not to come to Japan.
On January 19, 1960, Japan and the U.S. signed the Treaty of Mutual 
Cooperation and Security. The new treaty was valuable for Japan. The 
obligation of the U.S. was to come to defend Japan. This was clearly  
stipulated without Japan's commitment to defend the U.S. and American 
interests in the western Pacific:
Each party recognizes that an armed attack against either  
party in the te r r ito r ie s  under the administration of Japan 
would be dangerous to i ts  own peace and safety and declares 
that i t  would act to meet the common danger in accordance 
with its  constitutional provisions and p r o c e s s e s . 19
In public, the new treaty made a clear d istinction between right and
l e f t  wing factions concerning th e ir  world perception. The socialists
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believed that U.S. bases in Japan would involve Japan in an American war
with enemies of the U.S. On the other hand, Japanese leaders believed
that the new treaty  would deter an attack on Japan by the U.S.S.R.
However, the new treaty produced disputes about two a rt ic les . For
example. A r t ic le  IV of the new treaty  became a controversial issue
between conservatives and socia lis ts:
The parties w i l l  consult together from time to time regarding 
the implementation of this trea ty , and, at the request of 
e ith e r  party, whenever the security of Japan or international 
peace and security in the Far East is threatened.20
The question was "What is the Far East?" On February 1960, the Japanese 
government announced that the area of the Far East was the v ic in ity  of 
Japan, the area north of the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, the 
Republic of China and the northern islands. The chief of the Foreign 
Ministry Treaty Bureau, Kumao Nishimura, said the Japanese government 
could not prevent dispatch of U.S. troops from Japan to overseas areas 
when American operation could be regarded as necessary measures for  
the security of the Far East. The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Com­
mittee accepted the Japanese interpretation about the area of the Far 
East. The socialists  said Japan might be involved in an American war 
when the U.S. bases in Japan are attacked from the outside. The fear 
gave r ise  to a controversy concerning the area of possible combat 
deployment by the U.S. forces stationed in Japan.21
In the new trea ty , Japan got the right to check up on the deploy­
ment of the U.S. combat troops in Japan, and abolished A rtic le  I of the 
1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. I t  meant that Japan approached greater 
independence from the U.S. In the exchange of notes about the 1960 
Security Treaty, the Japanese and the U.S. governments promised to
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maintain Japan's r igh t of checking United States m il i ta ry  operations in 
Japan:
Major changes in the deployment into Japan of United States 
armed forces, major changes in th e ir  equipment, and the use 
of f a c i l i t i e s  and areas in Japan as bases for m il ita ry  combat 
operations to be undertaken from Japan other than those 
conducted under A rtic le  V of the said Treaty, shall be the 
subject of prio r consultation with the Government of J a p a n . 22
Japan's r ig h t of prior consultation was regarded as a primary method to 
protect her sovereignty. The U.S. government tr ie d  to te l l  the Japanese 
that the U.S. had no intention of v io lating Japan's sovereignty.
According to the Japanese government, "major changes" in the deployment 
would mean the deployment o f one army d iv is ion, one navy task force, 
the introduction of nuclear weapons, and the construction of missile 
sites in Japan. But the Japanese government took the position that U.S. 
nuclear vessels could pass through Japan's te r r i to r ia l  water and v is i t  
parts of Yokosuka without Japan's consent. When, in 1968, the Enterprise 
arrived at Yokosuka, the Japanese government claimed that i t  was not 
equipped with nuclear weapons, and was not engaging in m ilita ry  action .23 
In March 1960, Prime Minister Kishi at the Japanese House of Repre­
sentatives explained the meaning of the new treaty as follows:
I t  is true that under the present treaty American troops can 
use Japanese bases and that now the Japanese government cannot 
influence the operations of the United States m ilita ry  stationed 
h e r e . . . .  Under these circumstances there is a danger that Japan 
might be involved in a war without its  prior knowledge. But i f  
such a case should arise under the new Treaty, the American 
troops would have to get Japan's consent in prior consultations 
in order to move, and thus a l im ita tio n  has been imposed. This 
is one of the points wherein the new Treaty had been improved 
over the old one with logical r e v i s i o n . 24
Kishi exaggerated the degree of freedom which the U.S. forces had under 
the 1951 Security Treaty. Nevertheless, i t  was a fact that Japan had a
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legal method to check up on the deployment of the U.S. forces stationed 
in Japan.
Japan's primary goal in signing the 1960 Security Treaty was to 
get American protection and gain more independence. The U.S. primary 
goal in signing the treaty was the defense of the Far East from commu­
nist expansion. The new treaty was s t i l l  one sided compared with other 
alliances. Unlike NATO, Japan today is not obligated to defend the 
U.S. in the Western Pac ific , while the U.S. is obligated to defend 
Japan.
With the conclusion of the 1960 Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty,
China and the Soviet Union began to c r i t ic iz e  the Japan-U.S. alliance
severely. On January 14, 1960, the Foreign Ministry of the Chinese
People's Republic sent a statement to Tokyo about China’s position
towards the new security treaty:
The Chinese people have always been concerned about the 
Japanese people's struggle for independence, democracy, 
peace, neu tra lity  and against the revival of Japanese m il i ­
tarism. Since Nobusuke Kishi came to power, the Chinese 
government has moreover continually pointed out the danger 
of the Japanese reactionaries vigorously revising Japanese 
m ilitarism  and restoring to outward expansion with the 
support of the U.S. im p e r ia l is ts . . . .  The signing of the 
Japan-U.S. Treaty of M il i ta ry  Alliance signifies the revival 
of Japanese m ilitarism  and Japan's open participation in the 
aggressive U.S. m il i ta ry  b l o c . 25
On January 27, 1960, Soviet Foreign Ministry sent a memorandum to Tokyo:
. . .A r t ic le  VI of the treaty grants the United States use by 
i ts  ground, a i r  and naval forces of f a c i l i t ie s  and areas in 
Japan. The trea ty 's  reservations regarding consultations 
on i ts  fu lf i l lm e n t  cannot conceal the fact that Japan may be 
drawn into a m il i ta ry  c o n flic t  against the w il l  of the 
Japanese p e o p l e . 26
For China and the Soviet Union, the Japan-U.S. Mutual Security Treaty
was a dangerous m il i ta ry  a lliance for preventing communization of
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Asia. However, with the growth of Sino-Soviet tensions, China switched 
i ts  policy toward the Japan-U.S. a ll ian ce , and currently, China sup­
ports the alliance as a counterpart to the Soviet expansion in East 
Asia. The Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security of 1960 
offered not only a stable deterrent, but also a strong U.S. commitment 
in the defense of the Far East. As a result of the trea ty , Japan 
depended upon American m ilita ry  protection including a nuclear umbrella. 
The 1960 treaty has been the framework of this alliance.
Japanese Attitudes Toward Defense
The Japan-U.S. Security Treaty became even more essential for the 
security of Japan. Today Japan s t i l l  maintains a so-called three-point 
non-nuclear princip le . The principle bans the possession, production 
and introduction of nuclear arms. Thus, the U.S. is committed to provide 
a nuclear umbrella to Japan against any threat with nuclear arms. There 
is a national consensus that Japan should never again become a major 
m ilita ry  power. Under the circumstances, Japan has b u ilt  her limited  
defense power.
There seems to be reasons for Japan's in a b il i ty  to deal with defense 
a f fa irs .  F irs t ,  i t  is an evident fact that the security treaty has 
produced the Japanese psychological dependence on the U.S. for the ir  
security. Even today the Japanese, with the influence of long time free  
defense, lack a capacity to see defense a ffa irs  ra tion a lly . In the ir  
minds, the U.S. is dependable as a protector and is always ready to 
come to defend Japan. This feeling is similar to a child 's  dependence 
on his mother. This psychological dependence also has prevented the 
growth of healthy nationalism and healthy defense in tu it io n . Today most
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Japanese public schools never put up the ir  national f la g , and many 
students do not even know the content of th e ir  national song. The 
Japanese seem to have forgotten the importance of defense for the ir  
survival. Under the circumstances, defense policy and debates are not 
re a l is t ic .  Some Japanese proudly say, " I f  the Soviet Union invades 
Japan, we w il l  just le t  them into Japan without resistance. I f  Soviet 
occupation is bad, then we w il l  f ig h t ."  Actually, they believe i f  
such an aggression occurs, the U.S. w il l  immediately come to help Japan 
without Japanese e ffo rts .
Second, Japan's in a b i l i ty  to deal with defense a ffa irs  comes from 
the shock of total defeat in the Pacific War. The defeat produced a 
strong sense of p o lit ic a l passivity and pacifism. Of course, postwar 
pacifism has been ju s t i f ie d  by A rtic le  Nine of the Japanese Constitution. 
With th e ir  experiences in World War I I ,  Americans and Europeans came to 
a conclusion that m il ita ry  unpreparedness would lead to aggression from 
a potential enemy against themselves. With th e ir  experiences in the 
Pacific  War, the Japanese came to an opposite conclusion: that m ilitary
preparedness would mean war and Japanese aggression against other Asian 
countries. In the Japanese view, in order to achieve peace, m ilitary  
preparedness and m ilita ry  a lliance should be given up, and should be 
replaced with fa ith  in pacifism. Japan's religious militarism was 
replaced with i ts  religious pacifism. Before World War I I ,  the Japanese 
had believed, as long as they had fa ith  in Japan's final victory as a 
divine nation, they could always defeat evil enemies. They believed 
Kamikaze would stop American task forces l ike  i t  stopped the Mongolian 
invasion of Japan. Since 1946, many Japanese have believed that as long
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as they had fa ith  in peace as a peace-loving nation, Japan could always 
win. They feel that Japan should do nothing for peace and its  security; 
as long as the Japanese have fa ith  in pacifism, nobody harms them. They 
do expect that other nations understand the sincerity of Japanese 
f e e l i n g s . 27 A large part of t h i s  change was brought by MacArthur's 
educational reform. MacArthur wished to make Japan an Asian Switzerland 
during the occupation.
Third, strong a n t i -m i l i ta r is t ic  atmosphere also stemmed from 
A rtic le  Nine of the Constitution. The Constitution forbids the right 
of belligerency of the state. The 1959 Sunagawa Case handed down by 
the Tokyo D is tr ic t  Court required that the Constitution clearly outlaw 
a l l  armaments including the Self Defense Force and the stationing of 
U.S. troops on its  own soil under the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. S t i l l  
many legal scholars regard the SDF and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty 
as i l le g a l  and unconstitutional. P o l i t ic a l ly ,  the amendment of the 
constitution has been impossible because of left-wing opposition.
Fourth, the Japanese have been very cautious about m ilita ry  forces, 
and Lhis aversion derived from the nation's experience of militarism in 
the 1930s and 1940s. I t  is widely believed that a m ilita ry  establishment 
could become the antithesis of democracy. The SDF had existed under 
skeptical eyes in the 1950s and 1960s.
F if th ,  defense debates in Japan became a taboo under the trad ition  
of Japanese consensual ism. Japanese do expect to avoid discussion of 
controversial issues in order to maintain harmony with others--a t ra d i­
tion possibly derived from Confucius. Neither discussion nor argument 
are good manners in Japan.
\
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Sixth, Japan's domestic p o lit ic a l  situations have prevented the 
growth of defense debates. Since 1951, the ruling party, the Liberal 
Democrats have argued for the necessity of the Japan-U.S. Security 
Treaty and the qua lita tive  improvements of the SDF. On the contrary, 
the Socia lis t and the Communist Parties have argued for immediate 
termination of the Security Treaty and the dissolution of the SDF.
Their policy is disarmament neu tra lity . They label themselves as 
peace powers, but label the U.S. and the Liberal Democratic Party as 
war powers. P o l i t ic a l ly ,  there has been no atmosphere that could 
promote defense debates, but rather defense could have created a 
p o li t ic a l  c r is is .
Seventh, since the Japanese islands are isolated from the Asian 
continent, h is to r ic a l ly ,  the Japanese have been less sensitive than 
Europeans about the safety of th e ir  border. In fac t, from the seven­
teenth century to the middle of the nineteenth century, Japan chose 
non-defensive isolation as its  foreign policy due to the absence of 
outside enemies. However, when Japan was faced with the European 
colonialism at the middle of the nineteenth century, this non-defense 
policy was quickly replaced with m il i ta r is t ic  foreign policy. Geo­
graphically , Japan has been protected by the surrounding oceans.
Given these factors, defense debates in Japan became almost taboo 
during the period between the 1950s and 1960s. Under such an antim il­
i t a r is t i c  atmosphere, the Japanese o f f ic ia ls  have never considered 
th e ir  SDF as an armed force. They have continuously said the SDF is 
SDF, regardless of th e ir  possession of tanks, j e t  fighters and destroyers. 
They have proudly emphasized the existence of a weak SDF in order to
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impress people of the ir  sincerity in following the s p ir i t  of the peace 
constitution. This tendency remains even today. Personnel of the SDF 
cannot attend universities because of le f t is ts '  opposition, and they 
often hesitate to walk on the streets in the ir  uniforms.
At present, Japan is claimed to have increased its  defense efforts .  
In 1960, the size of Japan's GNP was one-tenth that of the U.S., and i t  
became a half that of the U.S. at the end of the 1970s .28 But the 
fundamentals of the Japanese-U.S. defense relations have not changed. 
Japan's defense is s t i l l  based on American protection even in the f ie ld  
of conventional forces. Without U.S. assistance, the fighting capabil­
i ty  of the SDF w il l  quickly disappear within a matter of days in a case 
of aggression. Since Japan's reluctance to defend i ts e l f  has been 
rooted in postwar pacifism, i t  is unlikely that Japan w ill increase 
defense capabilities as the U.S. requested. Even defense-minded Prime 
Minister Nakasone is unlikely to increase the defense budget beyond the 
s e lf  imposed one percent GNP defense barrier. Postwar Japan's political 
culture does not include the idea of m ilitary  se lf defense.
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I I I .  PRESSURE FROM THE NORTH
The Northern T e rr ito r ia l Issues
Russia has a history of expansion in East Asia. When Tsarist 
Russia began its  eastward drive in the seventeenth century, moving into 
eastern Siberia, Sakhalin, Kamchatka and the Kurile Islands, i t  f in a lly  
came to Japan. In October 1852, Russia's Admiral Putyatin came to 
Japan to persuade the Japanese to sign a commercial treaty. In 1854 
Putyatin put in at Osaka Bay, and broke into Japan’ s 300 years of isola­
tion. In February 1955, Japan and Russia signed a treaty giving the 
northern Kurile Islands to the Romanov Dynasty. In the Russo-Japanese 
War of 1904-05, the two states fought, and Japan in flic ted  a humiliating 
defeat on the forces of the Tsar. In 1939, the Japanese Imperial Army 
troops crushed the Soviet troops along the Sino-Soviet border. The 
Japanese have had enormous fear of Russian expansion for a long time. 
Masamichi Inoki, President of the Research Institu te  for Peace and 
Security, described the Russian threat as follows, "Imperial Russia was 
the f i r s t  country which threatened our isolation, and we were very much 
afraid of the Russian threat from the north.
Most Japanese do not have friendly feelings toward the Soviet 
Union and the ir  feelings stem from the history of Japanese-Russian 
relations such as the Soviet seizure of the Japanese northern islands 
in 1945 and Soviet violation of the Russo-Japanese Neutrality Pact. 
P a rtic u la r ly , northern te r r i to r ia l  issues have contributed to the 
decline of Japanese-Soviet relations. The Kurile Islands consist of 
island chains stretching from the Nemuro Peninsula of Hokkaido to the 
Kamchatka Peninsula. In this area, there are twenty-three small islands
32
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According to the Japanese records, treaties of 1855 and 1974 defined 
the Kurile as extending as fa r  north as Uruppu, and to the Etorofu and 
Kunashiri Islands (southern islands) as being Japanese te rr ito ry .
There are historical grounds for Japan's claim over the return of the 
northern territories--Habomai, Shikotan, Kunashiri, and Etorofu Islands. 
In 1754, the Matsumae local government in Hokkaido started trade on 
Kunashiri Island. In 1798, one Japanese erected a signpost on Etorofu 
Island as Japan's te r r i to ry .  With the signing of the 1855 Russo-Japanese 
Treaty of Commerce, Japan and Russia promised that the boundary line  
between Japan and Russia should be drawn between the Etorofu and Uruppu 
Islands. Northern Sakhalin had belonged to Russia, and south Sakhalin 
had belonged to Japan until the end of World War I I .
On August 9, 1945, the Soviet Union suddenly violated the Russo- 
Japanese Neutrality  Pact and declared war against Japan. At the Yalta 
Conference in February 1945, Roosevelt and Stalin  reached an agreement 
that provided for the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against 
Japan. In return, Stalin was assured of getting Mongolia, the Kurile 
Islands and the southern half of Sakhalin. F ina lly , Soviet forces took 
over south Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands (including the Etorofu and 
Kunashiri Islands) without meeting Japanese resistence. At that time, 
most Japanese forces on those islands had already been sent to the front 
lines in the Pacific . Since September 20, 1945, the Soviet Union has 
occuped Japan's northern islands i l le g a l ly  (Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai 
and Shikotan Is lands), as Russian te r r ito ry .  At the end of the Pacific  
War, approximately 16,000 Japanese were involved in marine ac tiv it ie s  
and were residents of these four islands. When the Soviet forces
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launched an invasion of the four islands, some residents were k illed  and 
many residents le f t  th e ir  home islands. Since that time, Japan has 
claimed Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan and Habomai Islands as their  
islands on the international scene. (These islands also offer valuable 
marine resources.)
In 1951, Japan signed the San Francisco Peace Treaty. By this 
trea ty , Japan acquired sovereignty again, and in return, the Allied  
powers made Japan renounce a l l  rights and claim to the Kurile Islands.
But this treaty did not determine the final sovereignty of these islands 
because the Soviet delegate refused to sign the San Francisco Treaty. 
Therefore, the Soviet claim was based upon the Yalta Agreement, of 
which Japan was not a member. In the Japanese viewpoint, the Kurile 
Islands are islands claimed north of the Uruppu Island, and i t  never 
included Kunashiri and Etorofu. But the Soviet Union has never had the 
intention of returning the northern islands. Since the early 1950s, 
Japan and the Soviet Union have made no progress regarding the northern 
t e r r i to r ia l  issues, regardless of Japan's continuous protest.^
There seems to be some reasons for the Soviet r ig id  attitude regard­
ing the northern te r r i to r ia l  issues. H is torica lly , Russia has never 
enjoyed natural geographical borders like  Japan and the U.S. have. I t  
is not an exaggeration that the history of Russia has been made by the 
borderless and defenseless geographical environments. The defenseless 
borders have invited foreign aggression against the motherland of Russia. 
The Russians have believed that th e ir  te rr ito r ie s  must expand, otherwise 
th e ir  security w il l  be in danger of foreign invasion. Therefore, the
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Russians have sought a buffer zone between the motherland of Russia and 
the outside world. Expansion is a way to survive.
Strategically and m i l i ta r i ly  the northern islands are very s ig n if i ­
cant. Until the end of the Second World War, the Kurile Islands were 
of great strategic value to Japan. On the Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands, 
the Imperial Navy and Army had kept some bases. The Hitokappu Bay of 
Etorofu was the departure point for the First Air Fleet (a part of the 
Combined Fleet) when i t  attacked Pearl Harbor. After the Second World 
War, the Russians occupied the islands and b u ilt  m ilitary  bases to defend 
Sakhalin and the Soviet Far East from American attacks. There are three 
purposes for the Soviet m ilita ry  buildup on the northern islands. F irs t,  
the Soviet Pacific Fleet stations in Vladivostok can be easily controlled 
from bases in Japan. As long as Japan had the security treaty with the 
U.S., attacks on the Soviet Far Eastern bases would come from bases in 
Japan. Attack forces such as task forces or submarines would have to 
pass through either the Sea of Okhotsk or the S tra it  of Tsushima. Bases 
in the Kurile Islands could deter such attacks. Second, the Kremlin 
wants Soviet control of the Sea of Okhotsk to defend its  Submarine 
Launched B a ll is t ic  Missiles (SLBMs) which would improve the Soviet global 
strategic position vis-a-vis the U.S. In the Sea of Okhotsk, the Soviet 
Union has deployed nuclear submarines of the Delta class. They have the 
capability  to attack the east coast of the U.S. from the sea near the 
Kamchatka Peninsula. M i l i t a r i ly ,  the Soviet Union is interested in 
control of the sea extending from Okhotsk to Petropavlovsk. The primary 
purpose of reinforcement of the defense line on the Kurile Islands is 
to secure Soviet sea control. The defense line on the Kurile Islands,
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the east coast of Siberia, and Petropavlovsk is designed to secure the 
Sea of Okhotsk. Third, the Kremlin intends to put psychological pres­
sure on Japan by its  m ilita ry  presence on the northern islands. The 
Kremlin wants to demonstrate not only that the northern islands are 
Soviet te r r ito r ie s ,  but that also anti-Soviet behavior would be dan­
gerous to Japan.3 For these reasons, the northern islands such as 
Etorofu, Kunashiri, Habomai, and Shikotan are very significant for 
Moscow. The return of the northern islands to Japan is unlikely to 
happen in this century, unless Japan invades them m il i ta r i ly .
However, most Japanese have ignored the m ilitary  and strategic 
aspects of the northern te r r i to r ia l  issues. Since the end of the Second
World War, the Japanese have never thought of m ilitary  factors in their
relations with foreign countries. The Japanese never understand why 
the Soviet Union is concerned about such tiny islands. Some Japanese 
further think that they have been fighting for the reversion of the 
northern te rr ito r ie s  for the sake of international justice. Unfortun­
a te ly , highly moralistic attitudes toward the return of the northern 
islands are unlikely to persuade Moscow.
There are three reasons for the Japanese to claim the return of
the northern islands. F irs t ,  reversion of the northern islands can be 
a fina l symbol of the end of the war. Most Japanese want to wipe out 
the last reminder of the defeat. Former Prime Minister Eisaku Sato used 
to say that the postwar period w il l  not end until the northern te r r i to ­
ries have been returned. Second, the Japanese seek a friendly sign from 
the Soviet Union. The return of the islands can be that sign. The 
Japanese would interpret the return of the islands as the universal
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v a lid ity  of the ir  good w ill  diplomacy, often called "omnidirectional 
diplomacy." Since the end of the Second World War, friendliness with 
a ll  nations has been a supreme value in the Japanese people’s minds.
The th ird  reason has to do with fishing. Former inhabitants of the 
islands have claimed the return of the islands in order to expand 
the ir  fishing area. However, none of these reasons is either p o lit ic a l ,  
m ilita ry ,  or strategic, but more psychological and even symbolic, which 
are reasons most unlikely to persuade the Kremlin.4
I t  is a historical fact that the northern te r r ito r ia l  issues have 
prevented the development of friendly Japanese-Soviet relations. Many 
Japanese fishing boats have been captured by Soviet naval patrol boats 
while they are fishing around the northern islands. Some Japanese 
fishermen, in order to continue marine business in the region, have 
become spy ships for the Soviets. They (pro-Soviet fishermen) offer 
Japanese made TVs, stereos, watches and m ilitary  information about the 
SDF and U.S. forces in Japan to Soviet KGB agents in the northern 
islands. In return, they get a guarantee of safe marine business in the 
area. I t  is also said that some fishermen were k illed  because of their  
refusal to become Soviet agents. The issues of the northern islands 
have had negative influence on b ila tera l relations.
Japanese-Soviet Po litica l Relations in the 1970s
Throughout the 1970s, Japanese-Soviet relations deteriorated 
through a series of unfortunate events. At the end of the Second World 
War, Soviet abrogation of its  neutrality  with Soviet detention of Japan­
ese war prisoners in Siberia, Soviet seizure of Japan's fishing boats 
and Soviet seizure of Japan's northern islands gave them a bad image to
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many Japanese. Throughout the 1970s, the relationship became even worse. 
In 1976 a MIG-25 je t  fighter landed at Hakodate Airport to seek refuge 
in the U.S. through Japan. The p ilo t  was Lieutenant Belenko of the 
Soviet Far East A ir Force and his a irc ra ft  was examined by both the 
Japanese and U.S. a ir  forces. Moscow was angry at Tokyo's way of 
handling the issue. At f i r s t ,  the fighter p ilo t Belenko insisted that 
he was forced to land due to a fuel shortage. He demanded that the 
top secret a irc ra ft  be covered by a hood. Then when the Japanese police 
began an investigation of him, he revealed that he was planning to seek 
asylum in the U.S. F ina lly , he was sent to the U.S., and his a ircraft  
was investigated in detail by both Japanese and Americans. Moscow 
blamed Tokyo as follows: he had landed in Hakodate because he had run
out of fue l, and Japanese authorities, by violence and with dope, had 
jockeyed him into defection, much against his w i l l .
On September 28, 1976, Japan's Foreign Minister Kosaka met with 
the Soviet's Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York. Gromyko gave a 
message to Kosaka: (1) Moscow is very much dissatisfied with Tokyo's
treatment of the MIG-25 incident; (2) the Soviet Union w ill never return 
the northern islands to Japan; (3) there w il l  be no acceptance of a 
Japanese invitation to Soviet o ff ic ia ls  until both countries develop 
better relations with one another. The meeting was conducted in a cool 
atmosphere. In September, 1976, Moscow informed Tokyo that Japanese 
vis itors  on the islands must have Soviet visas. Moscow o f f ic ia l ly  
declared that the northern islands were Soviet te rr ito r ies .^
On the other hand, the Kremlin has observed Japan from the ir  own 
viewpoint. In January, 1978, Japan's Defense Agency decided to purchase
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100 F-15 fighters and 45 P-3C anti-submarine a ircrafts  from the U.S. 
Moscow believes that Washington has given impetus to Japan's m ilitary  
preparations. Moscow has blamed Japan, saying that Japan is stepping 
up the arms race. In the Soviet's view, the primary purpose of Japan's 
m ilita ry  buildup is to suppress the national liberation movement of 
Asiatic peoples and th e ir  social progress. According to the Soviets, 
the Japanese have become and American imperialists' strike force in 
Asia.6
The Soviets seem to lack the capacity to understand Japan and the 
Japanese people. They also have the tendency to underestimate Japan. 
Some reasons can be considered for this attitude. F irs t, the Soviets 
underestimate Japan's power as a nation state. For instance, Japan­
ologists in the Soviet Union, such as D.V. Petrov and I.A . Latyshev, 
overestimate the m ilita ry  deficiencies of Japan. This incorrect image 
of Japan reflects on the top-ranking Soviet po litic ians. Despite the 
fact that two Japanese prime ministers, Hatoyama and Tanaka, visited  
Moscow, no top-ranking Soviet o f f ic ia ls  have ever visited Tokyo. Also, 
in 1977, Zenko Suzuki, Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, 
waited for almost two weeks at the Japanese embassy in Moscow to meet 
with his Soviet counterpart.
Second, the Kremlin wants Japan as a Soviet s a te l l i te  state. In 
February, 1978, the Kremlin proposed the draft of the "Treaty of Good 
Neighborliness and Cooperation" between the Soviet Union and Japan.
The draft required the abrogation of the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. 
Moreover, the draft contained an a rt ic le  relating to security coopera­
tion. I t  would mean, i f  Japan were attacked by the U.S., that the
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Soviet Union could send its  troops to Japan. Also, surprisingly enough, 
there was no a r t ic le  on termination of the treaty. The draft obviously 
aimed at the "neutralization of Japan." In the ir  eyes Japan is ranked 
with Vietnam or Mongolia.
Third, the Kremlin regards m ilitary  power as the most effective  
instrument to achieve its  po lit ica l goal. The Kremlin has attempted to 
impress the Japanese by a demonstration of its  m ilitary  strength. The 
"Ocean 75" demonstration ( fu l l  scale naval exercises in the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans) of the Soviet Pacific Fleet, the MIG-25 incident, the 
deployment of a Minsk (30,000 tonnage a irc ra ft  c a rr ie r ) ,  TU-25 "Backfire" 
bombers, and of SS-20 IRBMs in the Far East, a l l  work against Soviet 
goals in dealing with Japan. The Japanese people are not easily 
impressed by the deployment of m ilitary  power. Finally, Moscow could 
not prevent Tokyo from signing a peace treaty with China by the demon-
7
stration of its  m ilita ry  might.
With the growth of tensions in Japanese-Soviet relations, Tokyo 
gradually began to change its  directional foreign policy to cope with 
increased soviet pressure. Before 1975, Tokyo had kept an equal diplo­
macy toward Moscow and Beijing. This policy had been jus tified  by two 
main reasons. F irs t,  Tokyo has always wanted to maintain a good re la ­
tionship with Moscow. Second, Tokyo was very cautious of being 
involved in a Sino-Soviet conflic t. Both Beijing and Moscow regarded 
Japan as a potential partner in the ir  struggle. Japan has tried to 
avoid pressure from both states. For example, when Prime Minister 
Tanaka visited Moscow in 1973, the Russians raised the collective 
security issue. The Russians tried to get the Japanese to accept the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
41
concept of the Asian collective security system. The primary purpose 
of Asian collective security was to contain China by u t i l iz in g  Japan.
In Moscow's fina l communique, Japan refused to mention the issue to 
avoid pressure from China.
However, Japan's equally distant diplomacy toward China and the 
Soviet Union has been carefully removed since President Nixon's v is it  
to Beijing in February 1972. The Chinese leaders indicated that Beijing 
accepted the existence of the 1960 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty as a 
stable factor in the Western Pacific. In September 1972, when Japanese 
Prime Minister Tanaka visited Beijing for talks aimed at normalizing 
Japan-China relations, the Chinese leaders went even further to express 
th e ir  support for the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty. Moreover, with the 
termination of the Sino-Soviet alliance in 1980, Beijing openly began 
to support Japan's defense buildup.
There were some reasons for the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese 
Peace and Friendship Treaty. F irs t ,  a fte r  the fa l l  of the "Gang of 
Four" in China in October, 1976, Beijing's new commitment to economic 
modernization allowed Chinese economic cooperation with Japan. In 
February, 1978, Japan and China signed a long-term economic agreement, 
and Japan promised to provide her industrial plants and technological 
know-how. Second, Tokyo was influenced by the poor achievement in 
Japanese-Soviet relations. The MIG-25 incident, the "Ocean 75" demon­
stration of the Soviet navy, and the long, b it te r  1977 Japanese-Soviet 
fishing negotiations had contributed to the decline of Japan-Soviet 
relations. Tokyo began to pay more attention to China in economic activ­
i t ie s .  Third, Japan and China were aware of the Soviet m ilitary buildup
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in the Far East. Even today Moscow has feared that Beijing would be 
able to overcome its  m ilita ry  backwardness through cooperation with the 
West. On the other hand, Tokyo and Beijing have been concerned about 
rapid Soviet m ilita ry  buildup and its  increased presence. In 1976, the 
landing of a MIG-25 on Hakodate showed a weakness of Japan's defense 
system. In December 1977, two Badger bombers, equipped with AS-6 King- 
fish missiles, approached Japan's a ir  space to warn Tokyo about relation­
ships with Beijing. In February, 1978, a Japanese defense analyst,
Momoi Makoto warned that the Soviets were constructing new bases on the 
Sakhalin Islands and on the Kamchatka Peninsula. According to him, 90% 
of the Soviet submarines in the Pacific were stationed at Petropavlovsk, 
and were under the direct control of Moscow.8 With this strategic 
information, Tokyo decided to conclude the Sino-Japanese Peace and Friend­
ship Treaty. In East Asia, a Beijing-Tokyo-Washington triangle was 
established to confront Moscow.
While Tokyo-Moscow weakened by the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese 
Peace Treaty, an unexpected event--Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—was 
conducted, which further damaged the t ie s . On December 27, 1979, Soviet 
troops suddenly invaded Afghanistan and occupied Kabul. The Japanese 
Prime Minister, Ohira, was angered at the invasion. Chinese and Japanese 
top o f f ic ia ls  f e l t  that the Soviets must be punished, and the Soviets 
must be deterred from launching attacks against Iran or Pakistan. Ohira 
and his advisors sent a message of Tokyo's displeasure to Moscow. Ohira 
also f e l t  Tokyo ties with Moscow must not collapse. A final policy 
toward the Soviet Union emerged as a mix of policies designed to diminish 
the Japan-Soviet relationship without destroying i t .  On January 7, 1980,
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the Japanese government announced Japan's support of a Security Council 
resolution demanding the Soviet evacuation from Afghanistan. At the 
same time Ohira said the government had decided to stop the export of 
computers and other high technology items to the Soviet Union. Also, 
Japan's Import-Export Bank stopped credits to three jo in t  ventures— 
forestry development, pulp production, and harbor expansion in Siberia. 
On February 2, 1980, Ohira decided on a Japanese boycott of the Summer 
Olympics in Moscow. On May 24, 1980, the Japanese Olympic Committee 
decided to boycott the 1980 Moscow Olympics.9
The way Japan responded to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was 
unique in postwar Japanese diplomatic history because, for the f i r s t  
time, Japan joined hands with the West to protect the common interests 
of the industrial nations. This was the f i r s t  time that Japan had 
openly expressed its  ties with the U.S. and its  opposition to the Soviet 
Union. With Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Japan's participation in 
a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing triangle became even more obvious.
At present, Moscow is demanding that Tokyo should conclude a 
friendship treaty with the U.S.S.R. The concept of the treaty came from 
Brezhnev's 1969 Asian collective security proposal. This security net­
work would embrace a ll countries from the Middle East to. Japan. In 
other words, Moscow has tried to eliminate the significance of the 
Japan-U.S. Security Treaty and the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty by u t i l ­
izing the Japan-Soviet Peace Treaty. Moscow perceives that the U.S.S.R. 
is becoming encircled by the emergence of a U.S.-China-Japan alliance, 
while Japan, China and the U.S. are concerned about a rapid Soviet 
m ilita ry  buildup in East Asia. In the Japanese view, Moscow tends to
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overestimate the significance of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty. While 
i t  is true that the Japanese are concerned about Soviet m ilitary  pres­
sure, the Japan-China alliance does not immediately aim at an anti-  
Soviet purpose. Since Japan, with the s p ir i t  of the Peace Constitution, 
opposes any hegemonic behaviours, conducted by any powers, Soviet 
critic ism  of the Japan-China alliance is o ff  the mark.
On the contrary, the Chinese aimed at the construction of anti-  
Soviet containment by the conclusion of a treaty with Japan. They 
seemed to understand that the growth of tensions in East-West relations 
would diminish Soviet pressure on China. The Chinese leaders have 
dared to say o f f ic ia l ly  that the primary purpose of the Sino-Japanese 
Peace Treaty is to prevent Soviet hegemonism in East Asia.
Increased Soviet M ilita ry  Presence in East Asia
Throughout the 1970s, the Soviet Union has bu ilt  up its  m ilitary  
might in East Asia. Today, the Soviet Union has m ilitary  superiority 
over the U.S. in this region. From a purely m ilitary  viewpoint, Japan 
and the U.S. are faced with a threat of increased Soviet m ilitary  
power. Strategic environments in East Asia became more complicated by 
the emergence of a new sea power, the Soviet Pacific Fleet, and a 
modernization-oriented China. The relationship, fuelled by mutual 
suspicion and d is trust, is one of central importance in an area of the 
globe.10
Throughout the la t te r  half of the 1970s, the Soviet Union put 
constant m ilitary  pressure on Japan. In 1975, the Soviet Pacific Fleet 
conducted "Ocean 75" fu l l  scale naval exercises in the Indian and 
Pacific Oceans aiming at attacking the U.S. f le e t  and Japanese sea lanes,
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In the exercises, they conducted landing operations against the mainland 
of Japan, and cut o ff  operation of Japan's sea lanes by jo in t naval and 
a ir  forces. In September 1976, when a Soviet MIG-25 landed on Hakodate, 
Moscow severely protested against Japan's way of handling the issue.
A m ilita ry  headquarters in the Soviet Far East m ilitary  d is tr ic t  warned 
Japan's Defense Agency that the Soviet Far East forces were prepared to 
strike the Hakodate Airport to get r id  of the MIG-25. The number of 
Japanese fishing boats seized by Soviet naval vessels increased approxi­
mately seven times. In mid-1978, the Soviet Pacific f le e t  conducted 
large-scale naval exercises in the sea area between Taiwan and the 
Philippines along Japanese sea lanes, and they moved north to Etorofu 
(one of four islands in te r r i to r ia l  disputes between Japan and the 
U.S.S.R.). Naval exercises included f ir in g  exercises. Soviet airborne 
troops from Khabarovsk and a detachment of 4,500 Soviet marines stationed 
at Vladivostok joined the exercise in seizing Hokkaido. The Japanese 
took i t  as a warning against the possibility of the conclusion of the 
Sino-Japanese Treaty of Peace and Friendship. In December 1977, two 
Soviet TU-95 bombers equipped with AS-6 a ir  to surface missiles, 
approached the Noto Peninsula (west coast of Japan) and flew along the 
Japanese mainland. Defense Agency interpreted the mission as a warning 
against the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Treaty.
A fter the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese Peace Treaty in August 
1978, the Soviet 6th Airborne Divison stationed at Khabarovsk was brought 
up to fu l l  strength. The numbers of MIG-23 fighters, MIG-27 ground 
attack a irc ra f t ,  and Backfire bombers increased. In the Transbaikal and 
Siberian m ilita ry  d is tr ic ts ,  the Soviet Far East Rocket Force began
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deploying SS-20 missiles, which have a capacity to strike China, Japan 
and U.S. bases in East Asia. In January 1979, the Japanese Defense 
Agency warned that since May, 1978, the U.S.S.R. had increased its  
garrisons on the Kunashiri and Etorofu Islands. F irs t,  two thousand 
troops were flown there by airborne operations. Then 2,500-ton landing 
boats carried ammunition toward Kunashiri Island through the S tra it  of 
Soya. In June, 1978, Soviet submarines launched two SSN-6 Saufly 
(Surface to surface missile) directed at the Kamchatka Peninsula from 
near Etorofu Island. In September, 1979, the Soviets began construc­
tion of a base on Shikotan Island (which is a part of Hokkaido). The 
Soviet forces on the northern islands were estimated at an army division 
of 10,000 men, tanks, APCs (armored personnel ca rr ie rs ), a r t i l le r y ,  
MIL-24 helicopters and SAMs (surface to a ir  missiles). Japan's Defense 
Agency was not sure whether those troops had defensive or offensive 
purposes. In mid 1979, four Soviet warships conducted war games (sur­
face to surface, surface to a i r ,  and anti-submarine warfare) closely 
watched by the Japanese destroyers in the area around Okinawa. The 
Soviet f le e t  exercised direct naval attack on Japan's sea lanes. M i l i ­
tary sources in Tokyo also said that the Soviets b u ilt  a fourth major 
m ilita ry  port at Korsakov (only 60 miles north of Hokkaido).
According to Japan's Defense Agency, the Soviet Union deployed 
12,000 men before 1983, equipped with tanks, heavy a r t i l le ry  and attack 
helicopters on Etorofu and Kunashiri Islands. Moreover, the Soviets 
constructed an a i r  base at Burevestnik on Etorofu and possessed 4,500 
marines in the region. With the growth of Soviet l i f t  capabilit ies , 
these forces have become a serious m ilita ry  threat to Hokkaido.
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Since the Soviet Pacific Fleet possesses two Minsk type a irc ra ft  
carriers (the Ivan Rogov landing ship and medium type landing ships), 
they have enough capacity to send troops to Hokkaido. The Soviet 
m ilita ry  buildup is rapidly destroying the theory that they constitute 
no threat to Japan. At present, the Soviet Union is deploying 51 army 
divisions, 144 SS-20 missiles, a 1.6 m illion tonnage Pacific f le e t  
(the U.S. Seventh Fleet is only 0.65 m illion tonnage) and 2,400 combat 
a irc ra f t  in the Far East. Probably over half of them are primarily 
targeted against China. There are two major command headquarters at 
Vladivostok, Khabarovsk, and two divisions on Shakhain and several 
divisions on the Kamchatka Peninsula. Also, KGB maintains 75,000 
heavily armed forces on the Japanese northern islands Etorofu, Kunashiri 
Habomai and Shikotan.13
Also, the Soviets have enjoyed using Japanese spies within Japan 
to collect m ilita ry  information regarding the deployment of the U.S. 
troops and the fighting capabilities of Japan’ s Self Defense Forces.
At the beginning of 1980, i t  was revealed that a retired general of the 
Ground Self Defense Force had been a Soviet spy, giving information to 
the Soviet m ilita ry  attache. Colonel Kuri Kozlov in Tokyo. The Japanese 
government was surprised at the fact that the Soviets had already pene­
trated the Self Defense Forces and conducted intelligence actions.
According to Japan's Foreign Ministry, there are four possible 
reasons for the deployment of 10,000 soldiers on the Kunashiri and 
Etorofu Islands. F irs t ,  i t  is a part of the Soviet global m ilitary  
strategy. Since Soviet submarines, D elta-I l l  class and Victor- I l l  class 
have enough range to attack most areas of the U.S. from the Sea of
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Okhotsk, Soviet m ilitary  planners intended to protect the Sea of Okhotsk 
by construction of a series of defense bases along the Kurile Islands.
In case of a Soviet-U.S. war, the U.S. Seventh Fleet would attempt to 
break into the Sea of Okhotsk to destroy Soviet nuclear subs. In 
addition, Moscow intended to counter a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing triangle  
and expected a Japanese demand for reversion of the northern islands. 
Finally , Moscow decided to put psychological pressure on the Japanese.
In February, 1979, Japan's Upper and Lower Diet Houses passed a resolu­
tion to protest the Soviet m ilitary  buildup on the northern i s l a n d s . 1 5
P o li t ic a l ly ,  Japanese defense analysts believe that continued 
Soviet m ilita ry  buildup in the Far East and a Soviet penetration of 
Southeast Asia may accelerate neutralization of Japan, and eventually, 
the growing Soviet sphere of influence may draw Japan into the Soviet 
B1 DC.
M il i t a r i ly ,  massive Soviet m ilitary  presence in the Far East poses 
three major threats to Japan. Those threats consist of threats of SS-20 
missiles over Japan, submarine threats to the Japanese sea lanes, and 
conventional m ilitary  threats to Hokkaido.
F irs t ,  at the end of 1977, the Soviet Far East Rocket Force began 
to deploy SS-20 medium range missiles in the Siberian m ilitary d is tr ic t ,  
and i t  is evident that some of them are primarily pointed at Japan.
Each SS-20 has three nuclear warheads, each of which has a 150-kiloton 
warhead approximately 11-12 times as powerful as the Hiroshima type 
atomic bomb. Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko told the western 
press that i f  the U.S. and U.S.S.R. reached a diplomatic agreement as 
to the deployment of SS-20s and Pershing missiles in Europe, some SS-20s
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would be transferred to Siberia, out of range of Europe. Theoretically, 
i t  would be much easier for the Soviets to use SS-20s against Japan than 
for the Soviets to use th e ir  strategic nuclear missiles against the U.S. 
because the Soviets do not have to worry about re ta lia tion  from Japan.
In the case of a U.S.-Soviet war, Moscow may use SS-20s in Siberia to 
persuade the Japanese that Japan's cooperation with the U.S. w ill be 
dangerous to Japan's national security. So far the U.S. government has 
informed Tokyo that i t  plans to deploy sea-launched Tomahawk cruise 
missiles in the Far East by 1984. But these missiles can only reach to 
the front line bases in Siberia, and they lack enough range to attack 
inland.
In January, 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone met with President Reagan 
in Washington, and asked for U.S. guarantees that they would deal with 
the problem of SS-20s globally. In addition, Nakasone asked the U.S. 
to prevent additional deployment of SS-20s to Siberia because of 
Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) talks at Geneva. However, Washington 
has fa iled  to persuade Moscow to stop additional deployment of SS-20s 
in Siberia. At present, the Soviets can make bombs 4,000 times as 
powerful as those used in Hiroshima. Moscow has informed Tokyo that 
these missiles are needed to counter U.S. nuclear weapons in Asia and
the Pacific.TG
Also, submarines of the Soviet Pacific Fleet possess a capacity to 
cut o f f  and destroy Japan's sea lanes. The Japanese and U.S. governments 
have agreed that "sea lines of communication" means the waters for 
several hundred nautical miles around Japan's mainland and for 1,000 
nautical miles toward the southeast and the southwest sea lanes. Thanks
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to the combined strength of the Maritime Self Defense Force and the U.S. 
Seventh Fleet, the s ta b i l i ty  of the sea lanes around Japan has been 
maintained without becoming a serious security problem. However, the 
tran qu ility  of waters around Japan is in danger with the rapid growth 
of the Soviet Pacific Fleet and the decline of the U.S. naval presence 
in the region. I t  is a well known fact that when there is a crisis in 
the Persian Gulf, the U.S. Seventh Fleet would be dispatched there 
from the Western P a c i f i c . T h e  size of Japan's Maritime Self Defense 
Force is not large enough to cope with maritime operations of the 
Soviet Pacific Fleet without the assistance of the U.S. Seventh Fleet.
As a resu lt, some defense analysts say the window of vulnerability  
created by the swing strategy of the U.S. Seventh Fleet w ill  be f i l le d  
by the massive amount of Soviet naval vessels.
International trade is an important internal part of Japan's 
economy. An interruption of the flow of Japan's sea lanes constitutes 
the most serious threat to Japan's economy. Today Japan imports 99 
percent of its  total material requirements from abroad. At present, 
Japan's naval policy is faced with two problems. F irs t, since the MSDF 
has been equipped with small scale defensive weapons under Japan's 
postwar unique p o lit ica l lim itations, the Japanese navy seriously lacks 
offensive capability. Second, there is a widespread assumption that i t  
is almost impossible for the MSDF to defend Japan's sea lanes in wartime. 
This estimation is based on an assumption that large numbers of Soviet 
submarines can cut o ff  Japan's sea lanes easily. Also current access 
to Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam should give the Soviet Pacific f le e t  greater 
f le x ib i l i t y  in its  strategic planning. During the Pacific war, 50
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American submarines succeeded in cutting the Japanese sea lanes and 
put the Japanese in danger of starvation. 8̂
The Soviet Union has the potential capability to block Japan's sea 
lanes. China lacks such a capacity. There are two possible scenarios 
which can be applied to the defense of Japan's sea lanes. The f i r s t  
case is the extreme scenario—a major confrontation between NATO and 
the Warsaw Pact. With the outbreak of an East-West major confrontation, 
the Soviet Pacific f le e t  would engage in operations which are to prevent 
redeploying of the U.S. Seventh Fleet from the Pacific to the Atlantic. 
The burden of defending Japan's sea lanes in the Pacific might be a 
major obstacle for global U.S. strategy. Also, when Japan lacks the 
U.S. m ilita ry  support (fo r example, because of a widening gap from trade 
f r ic t io n ) ,  the Soviet navy could easily threaten Japan's shipping.
Japan has one geographical advantage with which to handle operations 
of the Soviet Pacific Fleet: she can block the Tsushima, Tsugaru, and 
Soya S tra its , which are the only entrances to the Pacific from the Sea 
of Japan for Soviet warships. Only Petropavlosk in Kamchatka faces the 
Pacific, but logistics problems would complicate Soviet maritime opera­
tions in the region. In wartime, i f  Japan blocks those strategic 
s tra i ts ,  the Soviets w il l  attempt to break through by a combination of 
SS-20s and th e ir  conventional forces. At that time, the Soviets might 
attempt to seize the northern part of Hokkaido in order to secure 
freedom of passage in Soya S t r a i t . 9̂
Third, the Soviet m ilita ry  threat to Japan is based upon the 
pressure of the ir  conventional forces o.n Hokkaido. Hokkaido is called 
Japan’ s f i r s t  line  of defense because i t  is so close to the Soviet
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m ilita ry  forces. I t  takes only forty  minutes to travel from the 
Japanese northern islands to the east coast of Hokkaido by fishing boat. 
From the northern part of Hokkaido one can see Sakhalin Island where 
the Soviets shot down a Korean commercial a ir l in e  in 1983. In order 
to defend Hokkaido, the Northern Army Command of the Ground Self 
Defense Force (GSDF) with headquarters at Sapporo, gives direct orders 
to four divisions: 2nd, 5th, 7th, and 11th Divisions in Hokkaido.
They are s trateg ically  deployed to check any Soviet aggression and 
designed to prevent the establishment of a foothold in Hokkaido. The 
7th Mechanized Infantry Division,in particular, is the most modernized 
division the GSDF has.
However, the defense of Hokkaido is a very d i f f ic u l t  task for the 
poorly equipped GSDF. According to Hiroomi Kurisu, former Chairman of 
the Joint S taff Council, superior Soviet ground, a ir  and naval forces 
could take over the northern part of Japan within a matter of days. I t  
would take five to seven days for reinforcements to get to Hokkaido 
from the mainland of Japan, and another couple of days to get them in 
combat. Therefore, 50,000 Northern Army soldiers would have to fight  
without getting support from the mainland of Japan (at least for ten 
days). I f  the Soviets launch an invasion on Hokkaido, i t  would probably 
be led by three motorized r i f l e  divisions (MRD) of about 11,000 men 
each. Since each Soviet division has about 266 tanks, the total would 
be about 1,000 tanks; 2.5 times as large as the GSDF tanks in H o k k a i d o . 20 
Most combat vehicles and personnel would be carried by two Minsk type 
a irc ra ft  carriers and the Ivan Rogov landing ship. Only surprise attack 
forces would be carried by airborne operations.
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Right a fte r  World War I I ,  Stalin demanded that the U.S. Occupation 
Army give the northern half of Hokkaido to Russia as a price for Soviet 
participation in the anti-Japanese war. Increased Soviet m ilitary  
presence in the Far East might influence the course of future po litica l 
tendencies in East Asia. Already in Hokkaido the neutralization of 
Japan seems to proceed quietly without drawing attention. I t  is said 
that the Japanese Communist Party has drastically  succeeded in expanding 
the number of sales for the weekly magazine "Red Flag."
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IV. JAPAN-U.S. DEFENSE COOPERATION
Japanese Awareness of Defense
This chapter starts with the introduction of a shocking current 
Japanese novel called "The Third World War" by a m ilitary  research 
group. Credible American defense commitment is indeed vital to Japanese 
security. But, given the widely prevailing Japanese be lie f that the 
r e l ia b i l i t y  of the Alliance has declined due to the decline of U.S. 
influence, this novel shows the ir  anxiety regarding security.
October 2, 198? Tokyo
China and the Soviet Union have been at war for four months.
The United States and its  NATO a llies  remain neutral rather 
than risk a Soviet strike against Western Europe or a move 
by Moscow to block o il shipments from the Middle East where 
its  hand has been strengthened by pro-Soviet regimes in Iraq, 
Afghanistan and (now) in Iran. The Pentagon has shifted the 
U.S. Seventh Fleet out of the Far East into the Indian Ocean, 
leaving Japan unprotected where an outburst of anti-Soviet, 
pro-Chinese sentiment leads to a break in diplomatic relations 
between Tokyo and Moscow.
Then--almost without warning--Japan' s nationwide constellation 
of m ilitary  a ir  defense installations are destroyed in a matter 
of hours in a rain of hundreds of Soviet SS-12 tactical 
missiles. Scores of Soviet fighter-bombers come screaming in 
under the country's obsolete radar net to fin ish the job.
Japan's equally antiquated Nike, Hercules and Hawk ground to 
a ir  missiles are useless to thwart the attack and go unfired. 
Thousands of mushroom-like canopies billow out over the Kanto 
plain as two divisions of Soviet paratroopers group of the 
coup-de-grace: the occupation of Tokyo.
More anxious to contain the Soviets by preventing hostilit ies  
from spilling  over into Europe or the Gulf than in coming to 
the rescue of a troublesome economic r iv a l ,  Washington shrinks 
from its  commitment to defend Japan under its  mutual security 
treaty with Tokyo. Demoralized by this ultimate American 
shokku, badly outnumbered and poorly-equipped, Japanese 
soldiers throw down the ir  arms without a fight. 1
During the la t te r  half of the 1970s, the Japanese began to feel
some anxieties about the ir  security with the rapid growth of Soviet Far
Eastern m ilita ry  power and in s ta b il ity  in international situations.
54
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Throughout the 1970s, changes in Japan's strategic environment 
have had a significant influence on Japanese attitudes about their  
security. In 1972, President Nixon suddenly visited China without 
warning Tokyo. The Japanese were shocked at the fact that Japan could 
no longer take U.S. support for granted. In 1973, Japan experienced 
an oil cris is and realized the strategic vulnerability of the Japanese 
economy. In 1975, the U.S. evacuated its  forces from Vietnam, an 
action which was perceived by the Japanese as the decline of U.S. in f lu ­
ence. After the fa l l  of Vietnam, the Carter Administration informed 
Tokyo of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea, and i t  raised 
a question about the r e l ia b i l i ty  of the U.S. defense commitment. The 
Iranian Revolution of 1978 and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan produced 
a situation in which there were no naval vessels of the U.S. Seventh 
Fleet around Japan. The Seventh Fleet was sent to the Indian Ocean, 
leaving a window of vulnerability  in the Western Pacific. These events 
contributed to a Japanese awakening regarding their security i s s u e s . 2
In particu lar, a change in the U.S. defense strategy had great 
influence on Japanese considerations of the ir  defense. Before 1969, 
the U.S. had pursued a "2 1/2 strategy" of maintaining m ilitary pre­
paredness for coping with cris is  in the two major regions of Europe and 
Asia, and with small scale crises in other regions. But his defense 
strategy was drastically  changed by the Nixon Doctrine of 1969. With 
the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, the U.S. began to pursue the 
so called "1 1/2 strategy" of maintaining m ilitary preparedness against 
a large scale war in Europe and a small scale crisis in other regions 
such as the Middle East. The U.S. decided to reduce its  m ilitary
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presence in Asia to a minimum level. The Nixon Doctrine insisted that 
both internal and external aggression, except nuclear threats, be dealt 
with by the Asians themselves.3 The Japanese could no longer take 
American protection for granted, and the age of free defense was brought 
to the end. The Japanese realized that Japan can never substitute for 
American m ilita ry  a b i l i ty  against the U.S.S.R. But, the U.S. withdrawal 
from Vietnam, the Iranian Revolution, and the Soviet invasion in Afghan­
istan symbolized the decline of U.S. influence on a global scale, so 
that the Japanese began to doubt the c re d ib il ity  of American defense 
commi tment.
While external changes have influenced Japan, self-confidence among 
the Japanese due to economic success has grown gradually, and today, 
young Japanese are prepared to consider the ir  defense more rationally . 
This economic nationalism has contributed to the growth of Japanese pride 
in coping with international a f fa irs .  The Japanese have become more 
serious when considering Japan's responsibilities in international 
communities, including defense of the ir  country. The merits of the 
security relations with the U.S. came to be appreciated by a majority 
of Japanese.
Of course, Japanese o f f ic ia ls  and politicians realized these exter­
nal and internal changes. In February 1978, Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo, 
for the f i r s t  time in postwar history, mentioned a defense policy in 
his speech to the Parliament. In the late 1970s, the Democratic 
Socia lis t Party (the fourth largest party) came to support the SDF and 
the Japanese-U.S. security arrangements. In 1981 the Clean Government 
Party, the third largest, came to accept the SDF and the Japanese-U.S.
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security arrangements. In 1980, Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira estab­
lished a Study Group on Comprehensive National Security as a primary 
organ. I t  was designed to conduct free discussions about national 
security. Today, over 80 percent of the Japanese accept the existence 
of the SDF and the Japanese-U.S. security arrangements
Japan's Research Ins titu te  for Peace and Security (led by Masamichi 
Inoki and a strong group of o f f ic ia ls ,  academics and defense experts),
submitted a report on defense to Prime Minister Ohira in July 1980. The
report emphasized growing uncertainty in new international situations;
"the most fundamental change in the international situation which 
emerged in the 1970s was the end of American superiority both m i l i ta r i ly  
and economically."^ Another report from the Inoki's Institu te  demanded 
a re a l is t ic  manner of defense debates in the Diet:
Looking back on the past national security debate in Japan,
we have to admit that no national environment has been
fostered to take up this question in a rea lis t ic  manner.
The debate has been s p lit  into two extremes, one in favour 
of a m ilita ry  build-up aimed at autonomous defense and the 
other in favour of complete disarmament based on pacifism ....
In particu lar, we strongly call for reflection on the fact 
that the debate in important po lit ic a l f lo ra , such as the 
Diet, has never moved beyond formalistic and empty legal 
contentions on mere ideological assertions and that the 
explanations of the government a l l  too often have been no 
more than responses designed to pursue logical consistency 
with precedents and to deflect po lit ic a l d if f ic u lt ie s  by 
patchwork. We earnestly hope that the government w il l  state 
i ts  positions on security issues with more c a n d o u r . 6
In March 1977, Mike Mansfield, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, announced that
"the Japanese people’ s attitude to the security and m ilitary  problems
has undergone a dramatic change in recent years to become more rea lis tic ."?
A series of external shocks such as U.S. withdrawal from Southeast
Asia, the announcement of the Nixon Doctrine, and the deployment of SS-20
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missiles in Siberia, have affected the Japanese awareness of defense. 
However, i t  does not mean that the majority of Japanese accept the 
expansion of the SDF and further strengthening of the Japanese-U.S. 
m ilita ry  t ie s ,  despite the fact that they accept the legitimacy of the 
SDF and the Japanese-U .S. security arrangements. In other words, their  
perceptions have become more re a l is t ic ,  and less idea lis tic .
At the same time, Japanese awareness of defense is related to the 
resurgence of power politics in international relations since the 
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Policy makers in many countries 
realized that power politics began to reassert themselves throughout the 
1970s. In dynamic power p o lit ic s , policy makers tend to equate demon­
stration of naked m ilitary  power with a tool of effective diplomacy.
Big powers sometimes dare to intervene m il i ta r i ly  in small nations. 
Today, the Japanese e l i te  realizes that i t  is very d i f f ic u lt  for Japan 
to stay out of international crises. There are two factors contributing 
to this Japanese feeling. F irs t,  since the U.S.-Soviet tensions are 
heightening at the global leve l, Japan's economic power and its  strate­
gic location have a large influence on their power games in East Asia. 
Japan can be no longer innocent. Second, since defeat in the Cuban 
c r is is ,  Moscow has increased its  defense budget annually 4 to 5 percent, 
and today has established an effective war machine as a result of their  
bloody efforts . Japan can no longer ignore increased Soviet m ilitary  
presence in East Asia.
However, i t  is unlikely for Japan to be a major m ilitary power in 
East Asia, at least in the near future. Most Japanese have not found 
a reason yet to accept Japan's m ilita r iza tion . Also, the Japanese have
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not come to a national consensus on defense. For instance, the peace- 
oriented view is argued by the Japan Socialist Party and the Communist 
Party. They say that a Soviet threat to Japan does not exist, but is 
created by the propaganda of Japanese-American reactionary groups.
They support A rtic le  IX of the Japanese Constitution and oppose Japanese- 
U.S. security arrangements and the existence of the SDF. They aslo warn 
that Japan's defense buildup would create a new militarism.
The second view is argued by some Diet members such as Utsunomiya 
of the Liberal Democratic Party and Yohei Kono of the New Liberal Club. 
They say that the Soviet Union does not constitute a threat to Japan; 
the threat is created by the American m ilitary  industrial complex.
They passively accept the legitimacy of the SDF and the Japanese-U.S. 
security arrangements. They believe that omnidirectional peace diplomacy 
is the most effective defense for Japan.
The third view is argued by mainly business-related people. They 
say that the Soviet Union is a potential threat to Japan, and support 
the legitimacy of the SDF and the Japanese-U.S. security arrangements. 
They argue that the most serious threat for Japan is its  vulnerability  
in depending upon materials from abroad. They believe Japan's defense 
program should be done to avoid po lit ica l crisis in the Japan-U.S. 
a l 1iance.
The fourth view is argued by some defense analysts, and is seen in 
the Inoki Research Institu te  for Peace and Security's reports. The 
Ins titu te  regards Soviet m ilitary  power as a potential threat and argue 
that Japan should increase defense capabilities within the context of 
the present Japanese-U.S. security arrangements and the present consti­
tution .
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The f i f t h  view, the most hawkish, is argued by some members of the 
Liberal Democratic Party and professional defense analysts. They regard 
Soviet deployment of SS-20s in Siberia, the presence of the Pacific 
Fleet and the deployment of 10,000 soldiers on the northern islands as 
a serious threat to Japan. They argue the necessity of a fast defense 
buildup and, i f  possible, the revision of the constitution to allow 
armed forces. They see new m ilitary  situations in East Asia as an 
opportunity to develop a more autonomous defense.#
At present, most bureaucrats and po lit ica l leaders support the 
th ird  view, and are not interested in a defense buildup. They feel that 
Japan has already enough defense power to defend i ts e l f .  According to 
a Yomiuri-Gallup p o ll ,  only 7 percent of the Japanese and 5 percent of 
the Americans think that a Japanese-Soviet conflict may possibly happen 
in the near future.®
The average Japanese have th e ir  own perception of Soviet m ilitary  
threat. Today, the majority of Japanese regard increased Soviet Far 
Eastern m ilita ry  presence as a potential danger. But they did not come 
to support the defense buildup immediately due to the fact that they do 
not equate Soviet m ilita ry  capabilities with Soviet intentions. On the 
contrary, the U.S. Defense Department deduces Soviet intentions from 
th e ir  capabilit ies . American defense experts came to the conclusion 
that they must equate the enemy's a b il i t ie s  with its  intentions from the 
Korean and Vietnam War experiences. (In m ilitary  textbooks, an enemy's 
capability cannot be separated from its  intentions.) Since the enemy's 
intention can be changed quickly in a changing environment, strategic 
assessment usually is made by his capacity. Most Japanese have never 
known this principle.
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Strategic Assessment of Soviet M ilita ry  Power in the Far East and the 
U.S. Defense Expectations of Japan
Throughout the 1970s, the most serious factor fo the damaged secur­
i ty  situation was the continued Soviet m ilita ry  buildup and the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. The attempt by the Soviet Union was to 
translate m ilita ry  presence into po lit ica l influence over strategically  
important areas. The Western Pacific is not excluded from Soviet 
attempts to put m ilita ry  pressure on American interests and a ll ies  of 
the U.S. Therefore, strategic assessment of Soviet Far Eastern m ilitary  
power became important for the Japan-U.S. alliance.
The apparent lack of a Japanese-American defense consensus stems 
from d ifferent strategic assessments of each other's defense policy 
makers. P o l i t ic a l ly ,  throughout the 1970s, U.S.-Soviet relations had 
rapidly declined with the expansion of Soviet influence in the Third 
World. Even during detente, thoughtful Americans were concerned over 
what was widely perceived as Soviet involvement in Angola and Ethiopia. 
In the f ina l days of 1979, detente was seriously damaged by the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan. Also in Asia, the Soviet Union was faced with 
the emergence of a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing triangle.
On the other hand, the U.S. m ilita ry  has a tendency to view Soviet 
m ilita ry  capabilities in order to determine the course of future a ffa irs  
in East Asia. The U.S. strategists have equated Soviet m ilitary capa­
b i l i t ie s  with intentions. In applying the U.S. strategic assessments 
to current m ilita ry  situations in East Asia, the U.S. emphasizes the 
emerging imabalance of power in the region. American strategic assess­
ment of East Asia is constituted by the deployment of Soviet ground
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troops on the Japanese northern islands, the establishment of a new 
m ilita ry  headquarters in Sakhalin, and the appearance of a new genera­
tion of Soviet weapon systems. Also, some defense analysts say that 
the Soviet Pacific Fleet w il l  s tart deploying a nuclear-powered a irc ra ft  
carrier in the la t te r  half of the 1980s. Dan Nang and Cam Rahn Bay in 
Vietnam offer good bases for the Soviets to monitor Japanese sea lanes 
in peacetime, and for them to launch possible attacks in wartime. U.S. 
policy makers assume that Tokyo cannot resist increased Soviet diplo­
matic-military pressure without Japan’s defense buildup. American 
concern for the acceleration of neutralization of Japan comes from a 
mixed pressure of continued Soviet m ilitary  buildup and Soviet penetra­
tion of Southeast Asia.
In contrast, Tokyo does not share American strategic assessment 
of Soviet m ilitary  deployment of East Asia. Japanese policy makers 
and the Defense Agency regard Soviet m ilitary  presence as a potential 
threat, although not a serious one. The Japanese Defense Agency has 
confidence that the Soviet Pacific Fleet has a serious weak point in 
its  geostrategic position. Naval vessels stationed at Vladivostok 
must pass through one of three strategic stra its  such as Tsushima, 
Tsugaru, and Soya Straits to get in the Pacific. But these straits  
can be blocked or mined easily in wartime. Also, Soviet ground troops 
in Siberia and Japan are separated by the Sea of Japan. The sea is 
hard to bridge. Airborne capability of the Soviet Far Eastern forces 
is lacking. The Soviet Pacific Fleet has only eleven landing ships, 
and only 4,000 infantrymen can be carried from Siberia to Hokkaido.
The Soviet ground attack a irc ra ft  such as the SÜ-17 and SÜ-19 can
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hardly reach Japanese a ir  bases with the ir  combat radius of 340 nautical 
miles. Even je t  fighters such as the MIG-23 and MIG-27 can hardly attack 
Tokyo with th e ir  combat radius of 500 nautical miles. The only exception 
is the deployment of 144 SS-20 missiles, which can reach a ll  over Japan.
In the Japanese view, Soviet m ilitary  buildup has a defensive 
character, which tends to discourage Japan from improving its  defense 
capabilities and further strengthening a Washington-Tokyo-Beij1ng 
triangle through m ilita ry  intimidation. Japanese defense analysts 
believe i t  seems most unlikely that the Soviet Union w ill start an inva­
sion against Japan as long as the Japan-U.S. alliance functions effec­
t iv e ly ,  and the Japanese defense posture appears effective.
Japan is surrounded by the sea, which is a strategic advantage for 
Japan's defense. I f  the Soviets seek to attack Japan, they have to 
consider serious logistics problems to sustain m ilitary  operations. 
Furthermore, the two nations do not share a common land border, and the 
northern te r r i to r ia l  disputes are not serious enough to create a m ilitary  
confrontation. I t  seems more l ike ly  that the Soviet Union w ill use 
po lit ic a l influence over Japan with its  massive m ilitary  presence. But 
i f  m ilitary  confrontation broke out between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., 
Japan would be involved in the confrontation. In that case, American 
forces in the Far East would be sent to strategically v ita l points such 
as the Persian Gulf, and Japan would have to cope with the situation 
without American assistance.^^
The Japanese are not easily influence by a demonstration of m ilitary  
power. Despite a massive Soviet m ilitary  presence in East Asia, the 
Soviet Union has fa iled  to prevent the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese
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Peace Treaty and the development of the Japan-U.S. jo in t defense opera­
tions. Rather, Soviet m ilitary  presence in the region seems to have 
accelerated the development of a Washington-Tokyo-Beijing triangle and 
the Japanese-American jo in t  defense efforts . So fa r ,  the U.S. concern 
regarding neutralization of Japan seems to be o ff  the mark. In other 
words, the Soviet Union has fa iled  to translate its  m ilitary power into 
p o lit ica l leverage over Japan. A major question is how much to consider 
m ilitary  factors in the context of present international situations.
Throughout the la t te r  half of the 1970s, several former U.S. ambas­
sadors, scholars, congressmen and bureaucrats have critic ized  Japan's 
free ride in defense a ffa irs . At the 1981 Shimoda Conference in Oiso, 
Robert Pranger of the American Enterprise Institu te proposed the 
necessity of a new shock to push Japan toward greater defense efforts.
He told Japanese delegates that Japan must make a move toward either 
becoming a regional m ilitary  power or toward Finlandzation (neutraliza­
t io n ).  In the U.S., Senator Helms encouraged Japan to develop more 
defense power by proposing a resolution which required Japan to pay 2 
percent of its  GNP to the U.S. as security tax. The Chairman of the 
House Foreign Affairs Committee, Clement Zablocki, introduced another 
resolution which called for Japan to spend at least 1 percent of their  
GNP for defense. Senator William Roth argued that while a llies  such as 
Japan were decreasing the ir  defense budget, i t  would be very d i f f ic u lt  
for the President to convince Congress to increase defense spending by 
cutting back on social welfare p r o g r a m s . 1 2
Japan has been a passive partner in its  alliance with the U.S. 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, the U.S. had guaranteed Japan's security
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and refrained from pushing Japan too hard in defense a ffa irs . American 
experts on Japan believed that too much pressure would be counter­
productive. At present, Washington feels that Japan is getting a free 
ride on defense. While NATO members are spending 3 percent of their  
GNP for defense, Japan is spending less than 1 percent. According to 
the 1983 Pentagon Report on Allied Contributions to the common defense, 
Japan's current defense efforts are far less than i t  is capable of 
contributing. While the U.S. provides 53 percent of the total m ilitary  
budget of the a l l ie s ,  Japan provides less than four percent of the 
t o t a l .13
In August 1975, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger openly crit ic ized  
the Japanese attitudes toward defense as too passive. In January 1980, 
the U.S. Defense Secretary Harold Brown in Tokyo asked Prime Minister 
Ohira to implement the content of the Japanese defense program, "Medium- 
Term Defense Buildup Plan (1980-84)" a year e a rlie r  than the schedule. 
Under the Reagan Administration, Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger 
visited Tokyo and asked for a coalition strategy and a buildup of a l l ie s '  
defense power to recover a balance of power vis-a-vis the U . S . S . R . 14
Particu larly , under the Reagan Administration, Washington's defense 
expectations of Japan are clearer. Washington, smartly enough, has 
stressed the roles and missions of the Japanese Self Defense Forces 
rather than defense spending. In peacetime, the role of the Japanese 
navy is mainly surveillance or interdiction over sea lines of communica­
tion (SLOC) defense. In wartime, Japan is expected to control SLOC 
lim its of 1,000 nautical miles, measured from Tokyo and Osaka at
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necessary moments. To f u l f i l l  this mission, the Japan Defense Agency 
decided to purchase 155 F-15 fighters and 72 P-3C maritime aricrafts.15
Former U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Robert Ingersoll, once said that 
Japan was expected to serve as a Far Eastern bulwark for the United 
States. His statement implied that Washington expected Japan to have 
blockade capabilities and to intercept Soviet Backfire bombers. In an 
interview with the Washington Post during his v is i t  to Washington in 
1981, Prime Minister Nakasone said Japan's position should be like that 
of a big a irc ra ft  carrier protecting against Backfire bombers. In 
addition, he said Japan should have the a b i l i ty  to control three stra its , 
Much of his statement reflected the U.S. expectation of Japan at this
tim e.16
There are two major positions constituting the U.S. defense expec­
tations. F irs t ,  throughout the 1970s, U.S. protection of Western in ter­
ests has declined with the decline of the U.S. economic power. In ter­
national conflicts have stretched U.S. resources to the ir  limits in a 
circumstance where Soviet m ilitary  power has dramatically increased. 
Despite Reagan's m ilita ry  buildup, the U.S. can no longer afford a 
strategy of "2 1/2 wars". Second, the U.S. feels strong dissatisfaction 
concerning trade with Japan. While the Japanese are making great pro­
f i t s  in the U.S. market, Americans are suffering from the highest unem­
ployment rate since 1933. Furthermore, the U.S. trade defic it with 
Japan has reached $20 b il l io n  a year. While the U.S. is spending 7 
percent of GNP for defense, Japan is spending less than 1 percent of 
GNP for defense- This situation produced an American linkage strategy 
of trade and defense toward J a p a n . 17 The former Assistant Secretary of
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State Richard C. Holbrooke described the U.S. defense expectation of
Japan as follows:
With a defense budget which has increased at almost 7 percent 
annually in real terms over the last decade and which now 
exceeds 10,000 million d o l la rs : . . .that country (Japan) now 
has the seventh or eight largest defense budget in the world.
But on a per capita basis the burden (82 dollars) is about 
one-seventh of what Americans pay (550 dollars); and over 
half  the American public wants Japan to increase its  defense 
efforts .  There is no question that the quality of the so- 
called 'defense debate' in Japan has changed markedly in the 
last three years, even in the past 12 months...! think over 
time the combination of increased mil i tary spending and other 
contributions to our common security such as economic assis­
tance w il l  ease the concerns of most Americans about 'free 
r id e '.18
Current Japanese Self Defense Force
Nearly three decades after  her defeat, Japan s t i l l  continues to 
perceive herself as a peaceful non-military state. Japan's foreign and 
defense programs are s t i l l  based upon principles of modesty, avoidance 
of confl icts ,  and close ties with the U.S. Japan and the U.S. have large 
common interests in the ir  relations including defense a f fa irs .  With 
the growth of Japan's new attitudes toward defense, Japanese-U.S. 
defense cooperation may be even more possible.
There are two tendencies in Japan's current defense policy. First  
is the movement to speed up the implementation of defense programs. 
Second is the movement to study further cooperation between American 
and Japanese forces in emergency situations. Today the quality of the 
Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) is a major subject in alliance po l i ­
t ics .  The Japanese SDF is designed to defend Japan within the framework 
of the Japanese-American defense cooperation and the peace constitution.  
Since the announcement of the Basic Policy for National Defense in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
68
May 1957, the primary purpose of the SDF has been to prevent direct and 
indirect aggression on the basis of the Japan-U.S. security arrangements, 
The SDF has been strengthened through four defense programs from 1958 
to 1976 under the s p i r i t  of the Basic Policy for National Defense. The 
First  Defense Buildup Plan (1958-1960) was made up for the rapid evacu­
ation of U.S. troops, and i t  constituted the framework of the Maritime 
Self Defense Force (MSDF) and the Air Self Defense Force (ASDF). The 
Second Defense Buildup Plan (1962-1966) was carried out for the purpose 
of coping with small scale aggression. Both the Third and the Fourth 
Plan could not achieve i ts  goals under the inf lat ion of the 1973 oil 
cri si s .
In 1977 the Defense Agency announced a new defense framework, the 
"Standard Defense Forces Concept," which aimed more towards the qualita­
t ive improvement of the SDF than to quantitative expansion. The d i f f i ­
culty for increasing the defense budget under a period of low economic 
growth and the d i f f ic u l ty  of recruiting enough youths for defense 
expansion had a decisive influence on the creation of this concept.
Also, this concept was based upon five assumptions in international 
m ili tary  situations: f i r s t ,  that Japan-U.S. security arrangements would
be maintained; second, that the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would avoid large 
scale armed confl icts; th ird ,  that the Sino-Soviet conflicts would 
continue in East Asia; fourth, that the U.S. and China would continue 
to improve their  relations; and f i f t h ,  that North and South Korea would 
avoid an armed confl ic t .
Under the influence of this framework, Tokyo decided to maintain 
the present level of the SDF. In November, 1976, the Defense Agency
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announced the "National Defense Program Outline" under the concept of 
the Standard Defense Forces. I t  emphasized the maintenance of various 
functions for defense in peacetime, the establishment of a balance 
between the front equipment (tanks, destroyers and so on) and logistics,  
and surveillance capabil ity. In the f ie ld  of nuclear weapons, Tokyo 
w il l  continuously rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent in the Pacific.
The possession of long- or medium-range ba l l is t ic  missiles, a ircraft  
carr iers,  strategic bombers, and the dispatch of the SDF to a foreign 
te rr i to ry  have been regarded as exceeding constitutional l imitations.19 
Also, Japan has imposed these three non-nuclear principles: not to
possess, not to make, and not to allow the introduction of nuclear 
weapons into Japan. This is the basis of her defense policy.
In July 1979 the Defense Agency planned the "Mid-term Service 
Estimate" as a guideline of weapon procurement during the five years 
from 1980 to 1984. The plan aimed at qualitative improvement of the SDF. 
According to the Estimate, the Ground Self Defense Force (GSDF) wil l  
procure 301 Type 74 tanks equipping 105-mm guns, 180 pieces of self-  
propelled a r t i l l e r y ,  110 Type 73 APCs, and 111 helicopters. The GSDF's 
personnel ceiling is kept at 180,000, and the ratio of fulf i l lment wil l  
be raised from 86 to 89 percent by 1984. The 7th Division in Hokkaido
wil l  be mechanized.20
The Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) wil l  procure sixteen ships, 
two guided missile destoryers, 10 general purpose destoryers, four 
escourt destroyers, five new submarines (2,200 ton, mounted with Harpoon 
missiles),  37 P3-C anti-submarine patrol a i rc ra f t ,  and 51 HSS-2B he l i ­
copters. Six old destroyers w il l  be equipped with sea Sparrow surface 
to a i r  missiles and Harpoon surface to surface missiles.
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The Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) wil l  procure 77 F-15 fighters and 
4E-2C early warning a ircrafts .  The Automatic Air Defense Control System 
(BADGE) which was bui l t  in the Korean War by the U.S. Air Force, will  
be replaced with a new a i r  defense control. The present BADGE could not 
cope with the penetration of a MIG-25 in 1977.22
This was a plan Washington asked Tokyo to accomplish the year 
ahead of its original schedule by 1983. So far the Defense Agency has 
fa i led to accomplish even the original schedule because of worsening 
financial situations and the one percent defense budget barrier.
In 1981, Japan spent $10.45 b i l l ion for defense, constituting 4.8 
percent of government spending and 0.9 percent of GNP. The SDF has
245,000 troops which consist of 155,000 troop army, 45,000 troop navy 
and 45,00 troop a i r  force. The GSDF has one armored division and twelve 
infantry division, one airborne brigade, one a r t i l le ry  brigade, two 
composite brigades, two a i r  defense brigades, one signals brigade, five  
engineer brigades, and eight SAM groups. The GSDF is equipped with 550 
tanks, 530 APGs, 230 anti-tank guided weapons, 1600 recoil less launchers, 
780 howitzers of 105 mm, 1300 mortars, 27 a ircraft  and 372 helicopters. 
The MSDF possesses 33 destroyers, 16 frigates, 14 submarines, 31 coastal 
minesweepers and 29 other assist ships. The naval a ir  f leet  consists 
of 62 P-2Js, 28 S-2F-1, few P-3Cs, 14 PS-ls and 54 Hss-2B helicopters.
I t  possesses no je t  fighters and bombers. The ASDF possesses 314 a i r ­
c ra f t ,  and is equipped with 130 F-4s, 90 F-104s, 10 F-15s, 30-Cls,
10 YS-l ls,  and 180 Nike SAMs. I t  possesses no bombers. 3̂
However, the SDF has a number of shortcomings and deficiencies. 
Particularly in manpower, logistics, equipment, command structure and
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i ts  legal status, the SDF lacks proper structural ab i l i t ies  to conduct 
modern warfare. Today, about 50 percent of Japanese defense spending 
is spent for personnel costs and only 20 percent is spent for the 
acquisition of equipment. As for the GSDF, nearly 75 percent of its 
expenditures is spent for the acquisition of equipment. As a result, 
over 70 percent of the GSDF's tanks, a r t i l l e r y ,  and anti-tank weapons 
are out of date. Each infantry soldier has only 16 bullets in storage, 
which might force them to f ight hand to hand in the event of depletion 
of bullets.
The MSDF lacks a i r  defense capability and their  operations wil l  be 
l imited within 200 miles measured from their  homeland. I t  is widely 
believed by some defense experts that most vessels wil l  be wiped out in 
the early stage of hosti l i t ies  with the Soviet Union. The ASDF lacks 
ground attack capabil ity, and no capability to support sea operations.
The absence of hardened shelters for a ircra ft  and early warning capabil­
i t ies  w il l  crush the ASDF at the beginning of hosti l i t ies with the 
Soviet Union. Japanese mil itary installations lack effective security 
a b i l i ty .  An enemy would only have to destroy a few radio stations to 
humiliate al l  mil i tary communications. Aircraft  of the ASDF are drawn 
up in orderly lines on the a ir  bases. In wartime an enemy could destroy 
all  of them. According to Osamu Kaihara, the former Secretary General 
of the National Defense Council, in case of a Soviet al l  out attack on 
Japan, the ASDF would be destroyed within 10 minutes, the MSDF within 
a couple of days, and the GSDF within three or four d a y s . 24
There are a number of problems in the f ie ld  of manpower. Since its  
establishment, the SDF has had a serious recruiting problem. For
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instance, the GSDF has remained at 85.2 percent of the authorized 
recruiting rate and 85.2 percent means that each division of the GSDF 
lacks 30 percent of its  necessary manpower. Moreover, the SDF lacks an 
effective recruiting or reserve system to replace casualties in wartime. 
For example, West Germany's armed forces have more than a million 
reserves. At present, the SDF have 40,000 reserves for the GSDF, 600 
for the MSDF and none for the ASDF. I t  is evident that the SDF has been 
discriminated against, socially and po l i t ic a l ly .  Also, the SDF has been 
constantly faced with shortage of ammunition, reserve fuel and training 
f a c i l i t i e s  since 1958. In the 1950s, the SDF's ammunition stock of
140,000 tons has fallen to 70,000 tons in 1980. Each interceptor of 
the ASDF is supplied with only four a i r - to -a i r  missiles.25
A most important deficiency is that the SDF lacks a proper strategy 
for integrated operations among the three forces. The missions of the 
ASDF are intended to defend Japan's a i r  space and do not include support 
of the MSDF. The MSDF lacks a strategy to maintain cooperation with the 
GSDF. The Chairman of the Joint Staff  Council lacks the authority to 
command three forces in the manner of jo int  operations. I t  is a wide­
spread rumor that in the event of emergency, the MSDF wil l  act with the 
U.S. Seventh Fleet, and the ASDF w il l  act with the U.S. Fifth Air Force 
while the GSDF acts independently.26
Under the postwar ant i -m il i tary  climate, the lack of a national 
consensus on defense has seriously weakened the morale of the SDF. The 
personnel of the SDF often feel that the SDF is nothing more than a 
"Paper Tiger." On July 25, 1978, the Chairman of the Joint Staff  
Council, General Kuris was dismissed from his post. He pointed out that
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the SDF lacks the legal basis to act in event of emergency. He said,
"I have no choice but to train my men to engage in supra-legal action 
i f  they are to repel a surprise attack e f fect ive ly . . .Local commands 
wil l  have no choice but to act on their  own."27 Under the present
Self Defense Law, only the Prime Minister has the right to order a
defense mobilization with approval of his cabinet and the Diet. With­
out the premier's order, the SDF can neither fight nor evacuate in an 
emergency. I f  the Diet does not approve a defense mobilization, the 
Prime Minister cannot issue a mobilization order. In a case of surprise 
attack, the SDF wi l l  be wiped out i f  they wait until they receive the 
premier's go ahead. This is the reason General Kuris said the SDF would
engage in supra-legal action in a case of surprise attack. In the Diet's
discussion, Deputy-Chief Murayama said that personnel of the SDF had no 
choice but to run. The SDF needs new legislation to act effectively in 
wartime, but i t  is assumed that such an attempt would face political  
opposition from le f t  wing and peace movements.
At present, the SDF lacks such capabil it ies, but technically those 
capabil ities can be acquired without changing the constitution. Accord­
ing to Masataka Kosaka, professor of International Relations at Kyoto 
University, Japan needs to implement some defense policies and the goal 
achievement would be 1.0-1.5 percent of GNP.
F irs t ,  the SDF needs to have an effective surveillance system to 
monitor the overall movements of mil itary forces, especially, the moves 
of Soviet a irc ra ft  and passages of Soviet warships through neighboring 
stra i ts .
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Second, Japan needs improvement o f  a i r  defense o f  the homeland and 
establishment o f  wide-area a i r  defense c a p a b i l i t ie s  to neu tra l ize  the 
movements o f  Backfire bombers, which are a menace to the Seventh F lee t .
Th ird ,  Japan needs strengthening of  the system— the command, 
c o n tr o l ,  and communication system.
Fourth, Japan needs buildup o f  c a p a b i l i t i e s  to prevent the landing 
of m i l i t a r y  forces ,  p r im a r i ly  through the deployment o f  a v a r ie ty  of
guided m is s i les .28
In a d d i t io n ,  the SDF needs some kind of reserve system in order 
to  f ig h t  continuously. In wartime,the SDF needs to get support from 
the res t  o f  the population,  otherwise the f ig h t in g  c a p a b i l i ty  of  the 
SDF w i l l  quickly  d e te r io ra te .  The SDF needs to acquire c a p a b i l i t ie s  
to r e s is t  aggression at  le a s t  fo r  several months u n t i l  the U.S. forces 
come to help Japan. In case o f  an American-Soviet m i l i t a r y  confronta­
t i o n ,  i t  is  u n l ik e ly  th a t  the U.S. forces would come to help Japan 
during the f i r s t  couple o f  weeks. In case of  a l l - o u t  attack on Japan, 
i t  is  possible the SDF w i l l  be destroyed before the U.S. forces could 
a r r i  ve .
Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation
J o in t  exercises between the SDF and the U.S. forces ju s t  s tarted  
a t  the l a t t e r  h a l f  of  the 1970s. This has been mainly due to pacifism  
and the p o l i t i c a l  tensions in Japan. At present, defense cooperation 
is becoming f i r m ,  p a r a l le l  to the q u a l i t a t i v e  improvement o f  the SDF.
In August 1975, the Japanese Defense Agency Director-General  
Sakata and U.S. Defense Secretary Schlesigner agreed to ta lk  about 
defense cooperation between Japan and the U.S. In July 1975, the
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Subcommittee on Defense Cooperation was established under the Japan-U.S. 
Security Consultative Committee. The subcommittee is composed of 
soldiers from Japan's Joint Staff Office and U.S. Forces Command in 
Japan, and talks about jo in t  operations, intelligence, and logistic 
support. In October 1978, the subcommittee submitted the "Guidelines 
for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation." The Guidelines deal with four 
defense operations: (1) penetration of aggression, (2 ) ,  impending
danger of mil i tary attack, (3) subjection to armed attack, (4) coop­
eration in coping with crisis in the Far East. As for the "prevention 
of aggression," they agreed to study joint  Japan-U.S. mil itary opera­
tions, jo in t  mil i tary training, exchange of defense information, 
adjustment of Japanese-American communication systems, and mutual 
support of logistics. As for the second issue, when there is a danger 
of armed attack on Japan, the SDF and the U.S. forces would engage in 
preparations for jo in t  operations.
In Japanese-American defense cooperation, the most important issue 
is the problem of jo in t  operation. In January 1979, the Joint Staff  
Office of the SDF and the U.S. forces in Japan had conducted studies 
about jo in t  operations in cases of Soviet invasion of Japan. In one 
scenario, they studied how the Ground, Maritime and Air Defense Forces 
prevent a Soviet landing on Hokkaido, and how the 1st Marine Air Wing 
(stationed at Iwakuni), the 5th Air Force (Yokota), the 7th Fleet 
(Yokosuka), and the 3rd Marine Division (Okinawa) would engage in the 
counter attack against a Soviet invasion.
In August 1977, the Defense Agency started its "Defense Study" 
in the event of an emergency. I t  was to be a basis for Japan-U.S.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
76
mili tary  operations. The Defense Study consists of three components: 
the SDF's defense strategy, Japan-U.S. jo in t  operations, and studies on 
legislation for emergency situations. Joint Staff  Office experts con­
ducted the study, and they primarily focused on a i r  defense, coastal 
defense, the blockade of straits and the prevention of enemy force 
landings under the situation of a limited small scale invasion against 
Hokkaido.29 Results of this study were used in the 1979 Japan-U.S. 
jo in t  defense study as basic defense data.
Also, throughout the 1970s, the Japanese and U.S. forces have made 
great progress in jo in t  training. The MSDF and the 7th Fleet have been 
conducting jo in t  anti-submarine warfare (ASW) exercises at least a 
couple of times in a year. In February 1980, the MSDF for the f i r s t  
time in Japan's postwar history, took part in the "Rimpac 80", joint  
training was conducted by the U.S., Canada, and Australia. In the f ie ld  
of a i r  defense, the ASDF's F-104 and F-4 fighters, and the U.S. F-15 
fighters have been conducting dogfight d r i l ls .  At present, the GSDF 
is studying jo in t  training with the 3rd Marine Division stationed in 
Okinawa. These jo in t  exercises promote close operational cooperation 
between the SDF and the U.S. forces in Japan.
Particularly , since the SDF lacks offensive capability, the assis­
tance of the U.S. forces has a significant meaning for Japan's defense 
strategy. Basically, the GSDF is designed to fight within Japan’s 
te r r i to ry .  The MSDF is designed to conduct ASWs and i t  lacks offensive 
capabil ity such as surface to surface and surface to a ir .  The ASDF 
consists of interceptors, but i t  lacks the offensive capability to bomb 
without the U.S. Fifth Air Force. In the jo int  defense operations, the
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SDF is to play a defensive role, but to rely on American offensive 
capabil ities.
The forward deployment of the U.S. forces in the Far East is 
composed of the 7th Fleet and tactical a i r  forces. The 5th Air Force 
maintains three f ighter squadrons in Okinawa to support the forward 
defense of South Korea. The 7th Fleet consists of two aircraft  
carriers, some destroyers and ten subs. In addition to such forces, 
the U.S. Strategic Air Command has maintained one squadron of B52s in 
the Pacific as part of nuclear deference. In wartime, Japan does 
expect that thes U.S. forces are to offer offensive capabilities, and 
without the U.S. assistance, the fighting capability of the SDF would 
deteriorate rapidly due to lack of sustainability.
At present, the Soviet Far Eastern forces constitute three major 
military threats to Japan. In order to counter these threats, Japan 
needs an American presence in the Western Pacific.
F irs t ,  the most serious threat the Soviet Far Eastern military power 
is presenting is SS-20 medium range missiles in Siberia. Since the 
Japanese government has adopted three non-nuclear policies to its defense 
posture, this threat can only be met with American nuclear deference. 
According to Yatsuhiro Nakagawa, an assistant professor in Political 
Science at the Tsukuba National University, i f  Japan were armed with 
60 intermediate-range ba l l is t ic  missiles, having the same capacity as 
the Soviet SS-20s, Japan s t i l l  would lack the strength to deter a 
Soviet attack in a Japan-Soviet nuclear war. The total population of 
the Soviet Far East is only 2.3 mil lion, while Japan has 388 cities  
with a population of 50,000 or more. I f  the casualty rate were 50
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percent ,  Japan would lose 40 m i l l io n  people while  the Soviet Far East 
would lose j u s t  over a m i l l i o n .  Also, while Japan could i n f l i c t  l i t t l e  
damage to in d u s t r ia l  f a c i l i t i e s  in S ib e r ia ,  the Soviet Union could 
destroy 50 percent o f  Japan's in d u s t r ia l  f a c i l i t i e s . ^ ®
Professor Nakagawa says, i f  Japan had a s t ra te g ic  nuclear force to 
s t r i k e  major Soviet c i t i e s  including Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev, i t  
would be a more a t t r a c t i v e  option.  At th a t  t ime, Japan would choose a 
s t ra te g ic  nuclear force centered on submarine launched b a l l i s t i c  
m issi les  because o f  lack of area and landing ICBMs. The estimated dev­
elopment cost f o r  Japan to have a r e a l i s t i c  s t ra te g ic  nuclear force  
might be 2 t r i l l i o n  yen a year.  Economically, th is  option is less 
a t t r a c t i v e .  The creat ion o f  Japan's independent nuclear force against  
the Soviet Union is more or  less unreasonable p o l i t i c a l l y ,  economically,  
and m i l i t a r i l y .  In order to get a trustworthy American nuclear umbrella 
f o r  Japan, Professor Nakagawa recommends tha t  the Japanese government 
should modify the three non-nuclear p r in c ip le s .  The introduction of  
U.S. forces equipped with nuclear weapons to Japan might be less provoc­
a t iv e  to domestic p o l i t i c s  and more e f fe c t iv e  against SS-20s in 
S i b e r i a . 31 However, the Japanese l e f t  wing ins is ts  tha t  th is  is the 
time th a t  Japan should terminate i t s  security  t ie s  with the U.S. Their  
lo g ic  is based on an assumption that  Soviet deployment of SS-20s in 
S ib er ia  is  a defensive measure against American nuclear weapons in 
the P a c i f ic .
The primary reason fo r  Japan's non-possession of nuclear weapons 
stems from the in te rn a l  and external s i tu a t io n s .  I f  Japan attempts to 
acquire nuclear weapons, i t  w i l l  meet strong opposition from both
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internal and external sources. Internally, i t  wil l  create a political  
cr is is ,  and externally, i t  wil l  be met with opposition from Washington, 
Moscow and Asian neighbors. Under these circumstances, Japan seems to 
have no alternative but to depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Second, Japan is faced with a threat represented by the Soviet 
Pacific Fleet. Japan imports 80 percent of its  petroleum consumption 
from the Persian Gulf, 45 percent of i ts  iron ore from Australia and 
30 percent of its coal needs from the U.S. I f  the Soviet Union started 
an attack against Japanese sea lanes, the Japanese economy would suffer 
serious damages, and maybe collapse. In order to secure sea lanes,
Japan needs to complete four defense measures: f i r s t ,  the Japanese
government needs to find the safest shipping lanes to avoid Soviet 
submarines; second, Japan needs to have the ab i l i ty  of control choke 
points to prevent the deployment of Soviet submarines; third, the MSDF 
needs to improve the quality of ASW equipments; and fourth, Japan needs 
to undertake diplomatic efforts to ensure the assistance of the U.S.
7th Fleet in the event of an e m e r g e n c y . 32
Third, Japan needs to ensure the security of Hokkaido. I t  has been 
said that the U.S. and the Soviet Union regard Hokkaido as a buffer zone 
between them. There is a high possibil ity that the U.S. will lose a 
war with the Soviet Union in Hokkaido due to its geographical closeness 
to the U.S.S.R. In September 1982, Washington announced that two 
squadrons of F-16 fighters would be stationed at the northern part of 
Japan (Misawa) to check the penetration of Backfire bombers. Some 
defense analysts in the government say Japan should ask Washington for 
the dispatch of the U.S. ground troops to Hokkaido as a symbol of
d e fe n s e  c o m m itm e n t.33 
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A series o f  ground, a i r ,  and naval j o i n t  exercises w i l l  promise 
successful defense cooperation. Also the U.S. can influence the scope 
o f  Japan's defense buildup. In September 1983, when a Korean a i r l i n e  
was shot down near the Sakhalin Is land ,  the SDF had gathered m i l i t a r y  
communications between the headquarters in S iber ia  and Soviet i n t e r ­
ceptors. La te r ,  the U.S. demand fo r  a Soviet apology was based on the 
information from the SDF in te l l ig e n c e  a c t iv i t é s .
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V. CONCLUSION
Under U.S. pro tec t ion ,  Japan has never seriously forced i t s e l f  to 
study defense issues such as strategy and budget. Since the conclusion 
o f  the 1951 Japan-U.S. Security Treaty ,  Japan has achieved i t s  security  
goals through i t s  dependence on the U.S. Today, most Japanese rea l ize  
tha t  Japan's security  has been maintained under the m i l i t a r y  protection  
of the U.S. At the same time, th is  fa c t  has created an ambivalence in 
Japan's a t t i tud es  to defense. The Japanese believe that Japan has 
existed under the dominant influence of  the U.S. due to her dependence 
on U.S. protect ion.  I t  touches t h e i r  pride. Also, there is widespread 
suspicion tha t  the U.S. defense expectations of  Japan serves American 
global strategy more than i t  serves Japan's security .  Too much American 
pressure w i l l  lead to the opposite public reaction. The Japanese people 
are re lu c tan t  to see Japan accepting defense expansion under U.S. 
pressure.
The most essential  goal of  Japanese defense policy is to create a 
national consensus on the role  of the SDF. Just ten years ago, with 
the inf luence of  the Peace Const itu t ion,  the Japanese said Japan does 
not need any defense power. At present, the majority  of Japanese sup­
port  the l ig i t im a c y  of  the Japan-U.S. a l l ia n c e  and the SDF, but s t i l l  
r e s is t  Japan's defense buildup and the expansion of the SDF's ro le .
Very slow progress in improving Japan's defense capab i l i t ies  w i l l  
continue to f ru s t ra te  Washington. I t  is ea s i ly  predicted that  Americans 
w i l l  increase c r i t ic is m  of  Japan's free defense r ide ,and  i t  w i l l  s t ra in  
re la t io n s  between Tokyo and Washington.
In the near fu tu re ,  the const i tu t ion  and pacifism must remain as
the framework fo r  the Japan-U.S. a l l ia n c e .  As a r e s u l t ,  the SDF w i l l
81
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continue to rely on the presence of U.S. forces in the Western Pacific. 
For example, the protection of Japan's sea lanes will  be le f t  to the 
U.S. 7th Fleet. The current level of Tokyo's weapon procurement wil l  
never be able to f u l f i l l  this mission. In the 1980's, Japan's defense 
capability wil l  remain a small non-nuclear force, intended to cope with 
a limited and small-scale invasion.
However, i f  Japan faces a grave threat from outside, history te l ls  
us that the Japanese wil l  quickly adapt to changing situations and 
create a united front against aggression. I f  such a threat occurs, Tokyo 
wil l  change its  defense policy drastically. {Economically, i t  is said 
that Japan has the potential to create conventional mil itary capabili­
ties equal to the combined forces of France and Britain within a couple 
of years.) Without such a threat, a rapid defense buildup is unlikely 
to take place, despite American expectations and increased Soviet 
mili tary  presence.
Japan has an interest in maintaining good relations with the Soviet 
Union. Despite northern terr i  torieal issues and Soviet military pres­
sure, Japan has economic interests in the development of the Soviet Far 
East. Also, most Japanese wish to avoid a direct military confrontation 
with the Soviet Union. Tokyo o f f ic ia l ly  defines the Soviet military  
presence as a potential danger, but s t i l l  hesitates to define i t  as a 
threat. Japanese o f f ic ia ls  are not persuaded of the wisdom of a rigid 
approach to the Soviet Union. Of course, they realize that the comple­
tion of the second Siberian railway wil l  help the logistical supply of 
Soviet forces in the Far East and that the SS-20 wil l  increase the 
threat to Japan. Today, Japanese off ic ia ls  believe that the Soviet 
goal is neutralization of Japan.
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In order to meet Soviet challenges, Japan's security  policy has 
three aims: (1)  The strengthening o f  a Beijing-Tokyo-Washington
t r i a n g l e ,  ( I f  the Soviets continue to increase m i l i t a r y  pressure on 
Japan, i t  w i l l  force Japan in to  a d irec t io n  o f  a Beijing-Tokyo-Washing- 
ton a l l i a n c e .  Already there has been an exchange of s t ra teg ic  informa­
t ion  between Tokyo and B e i j in g . )  (2)  The q u a l i t a t i v e  improvement of  
the SDF based on the "National Defense Program O u t l ine ."  (The expansion 
o f  the SDF and i t s  ro le  is u n l ik e ly  to take place despite the fa c t  that  
m i l i t a r y  balance is  more favorable to the Soviet Union. Pacifism in 
Japan is s t i l l  s t ro n g . )  (3)  The strengthening o f  Japan-U.S. defense 
cooperation based on the "Guidelines fo r  Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation." 
The creat ion  o f  a t o t a l l y  independent defense power is unthinkable in  
the 1980s. The defense cooperation would promote the modernization of  
the SDF to make j o i n t  operations e f f e c t i v e l y ,  so that  imbalance between 
operat ional  troops o f  the SDF and lo g is t i c  support w i l l  be diminished.
By the end o f  the 1980s, Japan's defense power w i l l  be more responsive 
and modernized despite i t s  small s ize .
Japanese defense forces w i l l  progress very slowly, but th is  is 
b e t t e r  than no progress a t  a l l .  Even Prime M in is te r  Nakasone is u n l ike ly  
to bring any change in defense po l icy  in sp ite  of his public image of  
being defense minded. I f  Japan should make a turn toward a rapid 
defense bui ldup, i t s  intent ions might be mis interpreted by neighboring 
countr ies .  Furthermore, i t  might create a serious domestic c r is is  
between the r ig h t  and the l e f t .  The growing in te re s t  in defense policy  
among the Japanese is not serious because they do not feel Japan is
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exposed to a direct threat. Changes in their attitudes toward defense 
come from a result of a change in the strategic environment.
Despite the existence of mutual understanding between Tokyo and 
Washington, a pol i t ical  crisis in the alliance could occur from Japan's 
lack of defense efforts.  I t  is natural that Japanese security policy 
is inevitably different from American security policy and those of NATO. 
The difference is attributable to historical,  geopolitical, and cultural 
backgrounds. For example, Japan, unlike the U.S., does not regard the 
Soviet Union as a primary enemy due to Japan's geographical closeness 
and mil itary deficiency. The crisis is that such differences might come
to be overemphasized either by Japan or by the U.S. The year 1990, the
30th anniversary of the present Security Treaty, might be a turning 
point of the Japan-U.S. alliance. There are three scenarios which can 
possibly be drawn at that time. First,  in the absence of Japan's defense 
buildup, the alliance might become a weaker political association like 
Sino-U.S. relations. (This is unlikely to happen because as Japan needs 
the U.S., the U.S. needs Japan as an al ly  to secure its national inter­
ests in the Far East.) Second, with Japan's defense buildup, the
alliance might develop a character like NATO. (This is also unlikely 
to happen because Japan and the U.S. do not share common ethnical and 
historical backgrounds as do the U.S. and Europe.) Third, with Japan’s 
small defense buildup, the alliance might continue to have the same 
character but be less unilateral.  I t  is highly possible that the reality  
might proceed on the third scenario.
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